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Note 
 
When Volunteers Become Employees:  
Using a Threshold-Remuneration Test Informed 
by the Fair Labor Standards Act To Distinguish 
Employees from Volunteers 
Emily Bodtke* 
Shortly after Rachel Juino started volunteering as a fire-
fighter with the Livingston Parish Fire District 5, a fellow fire-
fighter, John Sullivan, began to sexually harass her.1 Juino re-
ported the incidents to the captain and fire chief, but neither 
took action to discipline Sullivan or prevent future harass-
ment.2 After Sullivan ripped off Juino’s face mask during a dis-
pute at a fire scene, Juino ended her services with District 5.3 
Juino filed a claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission, and six months later she sued District 5 for sexual 
harassment and retaliation under Title VII.4 On appeal, the 
Fifth Circuit ruled that because Juino failed to show that she 
received significant remuneration for her services, she could 
not claim she was an employee.5 As a result, the court halted its 
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thoughtful feedback on this Note. Thank you to Laura Gordon, Kaitlyn Den-
nis, Samuel Andre, Jonathan Grant, and Joseph Serge for carrying this Note 
to publication with their careful edits. Thank you to the many teachers, pro-
fessors, and mentors who critiqued and strengthened my writing over the 
years. Thank you to my family, especially my parents Larry and Liana Bodtke, 
for teaching me the value of hard work, giving me opportunities to learn, and 
inspiring me to pursue a career in law. Thank you to Ugo Ubbaonu for unceas-
ing encouragement throughout the stresses of law school. Copyright © 2015 by 
Emily Bodtke. 
 1. Original Brief of Appellant, Rachel Juino at 4, Juino v. Livingston 
Parish Fire Dist. No. 5, 717 F.3d 431 (5th Cir. 2013) (No. 3:11-CV-466).  
 2. Id.  
 3. Id. 
 4. Juino v. Livingston Parish Fire Dist. No. 5, 717 F.3d 431 (5th Cir. 
2013).  
 5. Id. at 439–40. 
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analysis without any consideration of the traditional common 
law factors that show employment.6 The court concluded that 
Juino was a volunteer rather than an employee, and thus did 
not fall under the protection of Title VII.7  
Juino’s story is not unique. Many volunteers and other vol-
untarily unpaid workers like student interns have brought law-
suits alleging discrimination in their workplaces, only to learn 
statutory protections do not apply to them because they lack 
employee status.8 Determining who is or is not an employee is 
critical because the existence of an employment relationship 
triggers multiple statutory obligations and legal doctrines, in-
cluding minimum wage requirements, collective bargaining 
laws, anti-discrimination rules,9 workers’ compensation cover-
age, taxes and tax withholding, vicarious tort liability,10 and, 
starting in 2015 for large businesses, health insurance cover-
age.11  
Despite the fundamental and far-reaching importance of 
the “employee” determination, the proper judicial test to decide 
employee status in a volunteer context remains unsettled.12 The 
majority of circuits apply a threshold-remuneration test, which 
requires the disputed volunteer/employee to show substantial 
compensation before the court will examine the common law 
agency factors.13 Under this test, substantial compensation may 
consist of direct cash payments or significant indirect benefits 
not merely incidental to the volunteer activity.14 The Sixth and 
Ninth Circuits, on the other hand, consider remuneration only 
one of several non-dispositive factors in determining an em-
 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id.  
 8. See, e.g., McGuinness v. Univ. of N.M. Sch. of Med., 170 F.3d 974 
(10th Cir. 1998); Llampallas v. Mini-Circuits, Lab, Inc., 163 F.3d 1236 (11th 
Cir. 1998); O’Connor v. Davis, 126 F.3d 112 (2d Cir. 1997); Neff v. Civil Air Pa-
trol, 916 F. Supp. 710 (S.D. Ohio 1996); Lowery v. Klemm, 446 Mass. 572 
(2006). 
 9. See Richard R. Carlson, Why the Law Still Can’t Tell an Employee 
When It Sees One and How It Ought To Stop Trying, 22 BERKLEY J. EMP. & 
LAB. L. 295, 301 (2001). 
 10. See RICHARD A. BALES ET AL., UNDERSTANDING EMPLOYMENT LAW 8 
(2007). 
 11. See Dan Mangan, Delayed: Obamacare’s Employer Mandate for Small 
Businesses, CNBC (Feb. 10, 2014), http://www.cnbc.com/id/101393331.  
 12. Juino, 717 F.3d at 435.  
 13. Id. (“The Second, Fourth, [Fifth,] Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Cir-
cuits have adopted the threshold-remuneration test.”). 
 14. Id. 
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ployment relationship.15 This circuit split exacerbates the al-
ready existing difficulty in determining whether an individual 
is an employee.16 The split also demonstrates a growing non-
uniformity in employment law that challenges employers’ and 
employees’ ability to understand their rights and obligations.17 
Although the majority threshold-remuneration test identifies 
compensation as the key distinction between employees and 
volunteers, it suffers from inconsistency in application and in-
congruity with the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).18 Lack of 
a precise definition of “remuneration” results in differing appli-
cations of the test that further complicate the employment law 
landscape,19 while the lack of continuity with the FLSA creates 
situations where an individual might be an employee under one 
federal statute but not another.20 
This Note addresses which test should be applied to volun-
teers and other unpaid workers claiming employee status and 
how that test should be defined. This Note does not consider 
the arguments for or against legislative change to cover volun-
teers and unpaid interns under various federal employment 
statutes,21 but rather focuses on how federal courts should re-
spond to the current legal landscape. The judicial approach to 
the distinction between employees and volunteers is important 
because, while our economy increasingly depends upon volun-
 
 15. Id. at 435, 438. 
 16. See James O. Castagnera et al., Are Volunteers Employees?, 27 NO. 10 
TERMINATION EMP. BULL. 1 (Oct. 2011) (“In an economy where the lines be-
tween traditional employer-employee relationships and volunteers are blur-
ring in many contexts, settling the issue will take on increasing importance.”).  
 17. See Mitchell H. Rubinstein, Employees, Employers, and Quasi-
Employers, 14 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 605, 609 (2012). 
 18. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (2012). 
 19. See Karen Gwinn Clay, Volunteers and Title VII: How Far Do Em-
ployment Laws Extend?, 20 NO. 5 MISS. EMP. L. LETTER 3 (Aug. 2013) (discuss-
ing the uncertainty of what constitutes threshold remuneration in practice).  
 20. See U.S. COMM’N ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER-MGMT. RELATIONS, THE 
DUNLOP COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS - 
FINAL REPORT 64 (1994) [hereinafter DUNLOP COMMISSION]; Rubinstein, su-
pra note 17, at 628 n.121 (describing cases where individuals qualify as em-
ployees under one statute but not another). 
 21.  See generally Tara Kpere-Daibo, Employment Law—
Antidiscrimination—Unpaid and Unprotected: Protecting Our Nation’s Volun-
teers Through Title VII, 32 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 135 (2009) (arguing 
that Title VII should be amended to cover unpaid workers); David C. Yamada, 
The Employment Law Rights of Student Interns, 35 CONN. L. REV. 215 (2002) 
(recommending legislative change to include unpaid interns under anti-
discrimination statutes, regardless of whether they are paid). 
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teers and unpaid interns,22 the circuit split over which test to 
apply to such volunteers is widening (most recently in Juino).23 
Circuits that have not yet approached the volunteer-employee 
question will likely have to choose a side in the near future.24 
This Note presents the first thorough defense and critique of 
the threshold-remuneration test, explaining both its merits and 
deficiencies,25 and offers the novel solution to adopt a modified 
threshold-remuneration test informed by the FLSA. I propose 
that courts rely upon standards developed under the FLSA by 
case law and the Department of Labor in determining what 
constitutes significant remuneration to create an employment 
relationship under Title VII and other federal anti-
discrimination laws. Integrating the FLSA distinctions between 
employees and volunteers into the threshold-remuneration test 
will enable courts to determine employee status in volunteer 
contexts more consistently and efficiently without leading to 
divergent results among various employment statutes.  
Part I introduces the legal standards developed to deter-
mine employment status, with particular emphasis on volun-
teers. Part II analyzes the merits and downfalls of the thresh-
old-remuneration test as a means of identifying volunteers who 
should be considered employees. Part III proposes that courts 
uniformly adopt the threshold-remuneration test for volunteer 
contexts, but modify the inquiry to increase consistency in ap-
plication and ensure continuity with the FLSA. This Note ar-
 
 22. See infra Part I.B.  
 23. Juino v. Livingston Parish Fire Dist. No. 5, 717 F.3d 431, 439 (5th Cir. 
2013). 
 24. See id. at 435 (implying that the First, Third, Seventh, and D.C. Cir-
cuits have not explicitly addressed how to determine when a volunteer is an 
employee). For example, district courts in the Seventh Circuit have reached 
opposing conclusions on which test to apply to volunteers claiming employee 
status. Compare Jones-Walsh v. Town of Cicero, No. 04 C 6029, 2005 WL 
2293671, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 14, 2005) (finding that workers who do not re-
ceive any form of compensation are not employees under Title VII), with 
Volling v. Antioch Rescue Squad, No. 11 C 04920, 2012 WL 6021553, at *8–10 
(N.D. Ill. Dec. 4, 2012) (finding remuneration one of several common law fac-
tors courts must consider when determining whether volunteer ambulance 
squad members were employees). 
 25. Cf. Christopher R. Morgan, Bryson v. Middlefield Volunteer Fire De-
partment and the Changing Understanding of Volunteer As Employee, 17 
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1223 (2013) (arguing that remuneration should be one 
of several non-dispositive factors); Mitchell H. Rubinstein, Our Nation’s For-
gotten Workers: The Unprotected Volunteers, 9 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. 147, 179 
(2006) (proposing the uniform adoption of the threshold-remuneration test in 
volunteer contexts on the basis of its practicality and use by the National La-
bor Relations Board (NLRB)).  
BODTKE_4fmt 1/6/2015 3:00 PM 
2015] WHEN VOLUNTEERS BECOME EMPLOYEES 1117 
 
gues that the threshold-remuneration test offers the best meth-
od to determine employment status for voluntarily unpaid 
workers because it recognizes the centrality of compensation to 
the employment relationship. Despite this benefit, this Note 
recommends courts more precisely define remuneration to 
avoid creating yet another unpredictable test in the multifari-
ous arena of employment law and to conform to the FLSA regu-
latory framework.  
I.  DETERMINING EMPLOYMENT STATUS IN THE 
VOLUNTEER CONTEXT   
This Part describes the current legal framework for deter-
mining whether an individual is an employee under various 
federal employment statutes. Section A presents the major 
statutory definitions of “employee” and explains the various ju-
dicial tests developed to address the statutory definitions’ am-
biguity. Section B discusses the role of volunteers and unpaid 
interns in modern American society. Section C explores the var-
ious judicial approaches to voluntarily unpaid workers claiming 
employee status.  
A. LEGAL DEFINITION OF EMPLOYEE 
Questions surrounding who is and who is not an employee 
have long perplexed the employment law arena.26 This confu-
sion derives largely from employment statutes’ failures to de-
fine “employee” in a clear and useful way.27 The National Labor 
Relations Act (NLRA), for example, states that “the term ‘em-
ployee’ shall include any employee,”28 while the FLSA defines 
an employee as “any individual employed by an employer.”29 
Such “non-definitions” provide little guidance,30 essentially forc-
ing courts to apply a judicially created definition.31  
 
 26. See Carlson, supra note 9, at 298; Rubinstein, supra note 17, at 608.  
 27. BALES ET AL., supra note 10, at 7–8; Carlson, supra note 9, at 298; Ru-
binstein, supra note 17, at 608. 
 28. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2012).  
 29. Id. § 203(e)(1). Many other federal employment statutes adopt identi-
cal language. See Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 630(f) 
(2012); Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1002(6) (2012); 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (2012); Americans with 
Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12111(4) (2012); see also Rubinstein, supra note 
25, at 159. 
 30. Carlson, supra note 9, at 298. 
 31. See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 322 (1992). 
Finding that ERISA’s definition of “employee” “is completely circular and ex-
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In response to this statutory vacuum, courts have devel-
oped their own standards to determine employment status.32 At 
least four well-established tests exist to distinguish between 
employees and non-employees: the common law agency test, 
the primary purpose test, the economic realities test, and a hy-
brid of the common law and economic realities tests.33  
The Supreme Court indicated in Nationwide Mutual In-
surance Co. v. Darden that the common law test is the appro-
priate standard to apply where the statute at issue fails to ar-
ticulate a specific definition.34 The common law agency test 
focuses on the employer’s degree of control over the putative 
employee,35 analyzing a non-exhaustive list of anywhere from 
eleven to twenty un-weighted, non-dispositive factors to deter-
mine whether such control is present.36 The primary purpose 
test interprets “employee” based upon the context and objective 
of the statute in which it appears.37 The economic realities test, 
which courts apply in cases interpreting the FLSA, the Family 
 
plains nothing,” the Court decided to apply the common law agency test. Id. at 
323. 
 32. Carlson, supra note 9, at 298 (“The real work of identifying ‘employ-
ees’ and their employment relationships has always been in the courts.”).  
 33. Rubinstein, supra note 17, at 617.  
 34. Darden, 503 U.S. at 322–23; Stouch v. Bros. of Order of Hermits of St. 
Augustine, 836 F. Supp. 1134, 1139 (E.D. Pa. 1993).  
 35. Kpere-Daibo, supra note 21, at 143. 
 36. See Darden, 503 U.S. at 523–24 (listing twelve factors); Garrett v. 
Phillips Mills, Inc., 721 F.2d 979, 982 (4th Cir. 1983) (listing eleven factors 
relevant to the common law agency test); Rev. Rule 87-41, 1987-1 C.B. 296 
(listing the twenty factors used by the Internal Revenue Service to determine 
employment status); EQUAL OPPORTUNITY EMP’T COMM’N, EEOC COMPLIANCE 
MANUAL § 2 (2009), http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/threshold.html#2-III-A-1-c 
(listing sixteen factors). The twelve common law factors listed by the Supreme 
Court are:  
the skill required; the source of the instrumentalities and tools; the 
location of the work; the duration of the relationship between the par-
ties; whether the hiring party has the right to assign additional pro-
jects to the hired party; the extent of the hired party’s discretion over 
when and how long to work; the method of payment; the hired party’s 
role in hiring and paying assistants; whether the work is part of the 
regular business of the hiring party; whether the hiring party is in 
business; the provision of employee benefits; and the tax treatment of 
the hired party.  
Darden, 503 U.S. at 523–24 (citing Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 
490 U.S. 730, 751–52 (1989)).  
 37. NLRB v. Hearst Publ’ns Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 124 (1944) (“The word 
[employee] . . . derives meaning from the context of that statute, which ‘must 
be read in light of the mischief to be corrected and the end to be attained.’” 
(quoting S. Chi. Coal & Dock Co. v. Bassett, 309 U.S. 251, 259 (1940))).  
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and Medical Leave Act, and the Social Security Act,38 analyzes 
whether the putative employee is economically dependent upon 
the business he or she serves.39 This test considers six non-
dispositive and un-weighted factors that affect economic de-
pendence.40 Finally, the hybrid test combines elements of the 
common law agency test and the economic realities test.41 Cases 
applying this test vary on whether the control or economic reli-
ance factors carry greater weight.42  
Courts and scholars acknowledge that this multiplicity of 
judicial tests fails to resolve the ambiguities inherent in exist-
ing statutory definitions of “employee.”43 If anything, these 
tests further complicate the issue. By “perpetuat[ing] an ever-
expanding catalogue of ‘factors,’” which are non-dispositive, 
non-exhaustive, and un-weighted, courts have increased com-
plexity and reduced predictability in determining whether 
someone is an employee.44 Moreover, the sheer number of dif-
ferent tests and definitions can lead to inconsistent results de-
pending on which test is applied.45 Thus, both the indetermina-
 
 38. BALES ET AL., supra note 10, at 13; Myra H. Barron, Who’s an Inde-
pendent Contractor? Who’s an Employee?, 14 LAB. LAW. 457, 466–67 (1999). 
 39. Nowlin v. Resolution Trust Corp., 33 F.3d 498, 505 (5th Cir. 1994).  
 40. BALES ET AL., supra note 10, at 11. As articulated by one court, the six 
factors are: the degree of the alleged employer’s right to control the work per-
formed; the worker’s investment in facilities and equipment; the alleged em-
ployee’s opportunity for profit and loss; the degree of skill the performed ser-
vice requires; the degree of permanence of the working relationship; and 
whether the service is an integral part of the putative employer’s business. 
Donovan v. DialAmerica Mktg, Inc., 757 F.2d 1376, 1382 (3d Cir. 1985) (quot-
ing Donovan v. Sureway Cleaners, 656 F.2d 1368, 1370 (9th Cir. 1981)).  
 41. Rubinstein, supra note 17, at 627. Courts frequently apply this test in 
Title VII cases. Id.  
 42. Id. at 627–28. 
 43. See NLRB v. Hearst Publ’ns, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 121 (1944) (“Few 
problems in the law have given greater variety of application and conflict in 
results than the cases arising in the borderland between what is clearly an 
employer-employee relationship and what is clearly one of independent, entre-
preneurial dealing.”); Richardson v. APAC-Mississippi, Inc., 631 So. 2d 143, 
150 (Miss. 1994) (“[T]he various tests to determine the type of relationship are 
themselves generalities which can be viewed quite differently, depending upon 
which judge is applying them.”); Carlson, supra note 9, at 298–99 (“[T]he 
courts have scarcely been any more clear or precise . . . in developing defini-
tions or rules.”); Rubinstein, supra note 17, at 608 (“[T]here is no clear under-
standing about how the law should distinguish between employees and non-
employees.”); Rubinstein, supra note 25, at 160 (“From a public policy perspec-
tive, this lack of clarity is somewhat shocking.”).  
 44. Carlson, supra note 9, at 299 (noting that “the multi-factored ‘common 
law’ test begs the question of employee status as much as answers it”).  
 45. DUNLOP COMMISSION, supra note 20, at 64 (explaining that “the line 
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cy within each discrete test and the lack of uniformity across 
the tests produces a confused regulatory system.46 Such uncer-
tainty fosters litigation,47 increases the likelihood of misclassi-
fying employees,48 and creates absurd results where an individ-
ual may be an employee under one statute but not another.49 In 
short, the definition of “employee,” despite being fundamental 
to employment law, remains one of the most uncertain concepts 
in the field. 
The “employee” analysis continues to extend to new situa-
tions, sometimes resulting in new tests. For example, in Clack-
amas Gastroenterology Associates v. Wells, the Supreme Court 
considered whether four physician-shareholders at a medical 
clinic were employees under the Americans with Disabilities 
Act (ADA).50 Although the Court concluded that the common-
law element of control should be the “principal guidepost,” it 
adopted a new six-factor test promulgated by the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) for the unique 
problem of determining the employment status of major share-
holders.51 The Court’s approach shows that traditional tests de-
veloped in an independent contractor versus employee context 
may not be binding in novel employment situations that involve 
different relationship dynamics.52  
B. VOLUNTEERS IN THE UNITED STATES 
In most cases analyzing the boundaries of the employment 
relationship, courts distinguished employees from independent 
 
has been drawn differently in the different statutes”); Rubinstein, supra note 
17, at 617 (stating that the definition of employee is not uniform across federal 
law).  
 46. DUNLOP COMMISSION, supra note 20, at 64 (describing the employ-
ment law system as a “regulatory morass”).  
 47. Rubinstein, supra note 17, at 609. 
 48. Employee misclassification can be intentional, reckless, or honestly 
mistaken. Compare Carlson, supra note 9, at 336 (“[L]egal uncertainty en-
courages and rewards employer conduct that tests the limits of the law.”), with 
Rubinstein, supra note 25, at 160 (noting that mistakenly misclassifying an 
employee can lead to enormous and unexpected financial consequences for an 
employer).  
 49. DUNLOP COMMISSION, supra note 20; see also Rubinstein, supra note 
17, at 628 n.121 (describing cases where individuals qualify as employees un-
der one statute but not another).  
 50. Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 440 
(2003). 
 51. Id. at 448–49. 
 52. Rubinstein, supra note 25, at 173.  
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contractors.53 As Clackamas demonstrated, however, the “em-
ployee” question is extending to new situations where the fac-
tors developed to address the employee-independent contractor 
distinction may be less relevant.54 One new situation courts in-
creasingly encounter is a volunteer claiming employee status.55  
The dictionary defines a volunteer as “a person who volun-
tarily offers himself or herself for a service or undertaking” or 
“a person who performs a service willingly and without pay.”56 
Writing about the history of American volunteers, Susan Ellis 
and Katherine Noyes argue that using lack of payment as the 
sole defining factor of a volunteer is too narrow.57 Rather, Ellis 
and Noyes contend that it is possible to receive money and still 
be considered a volunteer, pointing out that Peace Corps mem-
bers (typically considered volunteers) receive stipends to cover 
living expenses and most volunteers receive reimbursements 
for out-of-pocket expenses.58 Ellis and Noyes propose their own 
definition of volunteering: “to choose to act in recognition of a 
need, with an attitude of social responsibility and without con-
cern for monetary profit, going beyond one’s basic obligations.”59  
A somewhat similar but distinguishable definition arises in 
the case of the unpaid student intern. The unpaid intern, like 
the traditional volunteer, works voluntarily without pay or ob-
ligation, but not out of humanitarian, charitable, or social mo-
tivations. Rather, these volunteers work in exchange for valua-
ble job experience and potential career opportunities.60  
 
 53. O’Connor v. Davis, 126 F.3d 112, 115 (1997). 
 54. Clackamas, 538 U.S. at 448–49; Rubinstein, supra note 25, at 173.  
 55. See, e.g., Juino v. Livingston Parish Fire Dist. No. 5, 717 F.3d 431, 432 
(5th Cir. 2013); Bryson v. Middlefield Volunteer Fire Dept., Inc., 656 F.3d 348, 
350–51 (6th Cir. 2011); see also Castagnera et al., supra note 16, at 2 (observ-
ing that the line between employee and volunteers is “blurring in many con-
texts”). 
 56. Volunteer, DICTIONARY.COM, http://www.dictionary.reference.com/ 
browse/volunteer (last visited Dec. 4, 2014). 
 57. SUSAN J. ELLIS & KATHERINE H. NOYES, BY THE PEOPLE: A HISTORY 
OF AMERICANS AS VOLUNTEERS 2 (rev. ed. 1990).  
 58. Id. at 3.  
 59. Id. at 4. 
 60. See Craig J. Ortner, Adapting Title VII to Modern Employment Reali-
ties: The Case for the Unpaid Intern, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2613, 2618 (1998); 
Yamada, supra note 21, at 220. The distinction between traditional volunteers 
and unpaid interns appears to lie primarily in their motivations and depend-
ence on the volunteer opportunity. See O’Connor v. Davis, 126 F.3d 112, 119 
(2d Cir. 1997) (acknowledging that the student intern claiming harassment 
“was dependent to some degree on successfully completing her internship”). 
Other scholars, however, conclude that traditional volunteers donate their 
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Employment law scholar Mitchell Rubinstein classifies 
volunteers into two types: a “pure volunteer” or a “volunteer 
plus.”61 A “pure volunteer” “receives nothing in return from the 
organization he or she is serving,”62 while a “volunteer plus” re-
ceives reimbursement of expenses and other types of “minor 
benefits such as death or disability insurance or even a small 
stipend.”63  
The law also attempts to define volunteer in various places, 
although not in any of the major federal employment statutes 
themselves.64 The regulations for the FLSA contain a definition 
of volunteer that restricts the concept to voluntary and uncom-
pensated service at public agencies.65 In practice, the Depart-
ment of Labor also recognizes that volunteers who donate their 
labor to nonprofit organizations out of “public service, religious, 
or humanitarian objectives” are not employees.66 The Volunteer 
Protection Act, which provides immunity from negligence law-
suits to a nonprofit organization’s volunteers,67 defines volun-
teer as someone who performs services for a nonprofit organiza-
tion or governmental unit without compensation, or anything of 
value in lieu of compensation, over $500 a year.68  
Although no single definition of volunteer garners complete 
consensus,69 it is virtually undisputed that volunteers play a 
critical role in American society.70 Approximately 62.6 million 
 
services for multiple reasons, including “their own personal and social goals 
and needs.” JON VAN TIL, MAPPING THE THIRD SECTOR: VOLUNTARISM IN A 
CHANGING SOCIAL ECONOMY 26 (1988).  
 61. Rubinstein, supra note 25, at 153.  
 62. Id.  
 63. Id. 
 64. See Leda E. Dunn, “Protection” of Volunteers Under Federal Employ-
ment Law: Discouraging Voluntarism?, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 451, 453 (1992). 
 65. 29 C.F.R. § 553.101 (2012) (“An individual who performs hours of ser-
vice for a public agency for civic, charitable, or humanitarian reasons, without 
promise, expectation or receipt of compensation for services rendered, is con-
sidered to be a volunteer during such hours.”). 
 66. Fair Labor Standards Act Advisor: Volunteers, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., 
http://www.dol.gov/elaws/esa/flsa/scope/er16.asp (last visited Dec. 4, 2014). 
The Department of Labor specifies that individuals cannot volunteer services 
to “for-profit private sector employers.” Id. 
 67. MELANIE L. HERMAN ET AL., NO SURPRISES: HARMONIZING RISK AND 
REWARD IN VOLUNTEER MANAGEMENT 120 (4th ed. 2006). 
 68. Volunteer Protection Act of 1997, 42 U.S.C. § 14505(6) (2012). 
 69. ELLIS & NOYES, supra note 57, at 2. 
 70. See Lauren Attard, A Price on Volunteerism: The Public Has a Higher 
Duty To Accommodate Volunteers, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1089, 1089 (2007) 
(“Volunteers are essential to the proper functioning of America.”); Dunn, supra 
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people volunteered at least once between September 2012 and 
September 2013 with a median of fifty hours of service per vol-
unteer.71 Volunteers serve in sectors ranging from religion, edu-
cation, cultural arts, public safety, and politics to the less intui-
tive areas of labor, agriculture, business, and industry.72 These 
voluntarily unpaid services grow increasingly important as 
governments reduce their budgets73 and nonprofits seek to sup-
plement a small paid staff.74  
Unpaid internships also play a vital and growing role in 
the American economy. Although no one keeps statistics on the 
number of unpaid internships, there is widespread agreement 
that the number has increased to approximately half a million 
per year.75 Internships offer valuable job experience and future 
employment opportunities to students, while providing cheap 
labor and a convenient employee selection process for employ-
ers.76 
The prominence and importance of volunteerism in Ameri-
can society suggests that the employment status of volunteer 
workers will critically affect the nonprofit community, the gov-
ernmental sector, and business industry.77  
C. WHEN DOES A VOLUNTEER BECOME AN EMPLOYEE? 
Standards to determine volunteers’ employment status 
have developed for primarily two purposes: (1) wage and hour 
protections under the FLSA, and (2) anti-discrimination em-
ployment statutes. The analysis under the FLSA rests to some 
 
note 64, at 452 (noting the “pervasiveness of voluntarism in the United 
States”); Rubinstein, supra note 25, at 148 (“[V]oluntarism is critically im-
portant to the welfare of this country, particularly in these days of ever-
increasing budget cuts.”). See generally ELLIS & NOYES, supra note 57 (provid-
ing a history of volunteers in the United States since 1607).  
 71. Volunteering in the United States—2013, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., BUREAU 
OF LAB. STAT. (Feb. 25, 2014), at 1, http://www.bls.gov/news.release/ 
pdf/volun.pdf. The Bureau of Labor Statistics defines volunteers as “persons 
who did unpaid work (except for expenses) through or for an organization,” a 
definition that includes traditional volunteers as well as unpaid interns. Id.  
 72. ELLIS & NOYES, supra note 57, at 314–48.  
 73. Rubinstein, supra note 25, at 148. 
 74. Attard, supra note 70, at 1089. 
 75. Steven Greenhouse, Jobs Few, Grads Flock to Unpaid Internships, 
N.Y. TIMES (May 5, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/06/business/ 
unpaid-internships-dont-always-deliver.html.  
 76. Ortner, supra note 60, at 2616–21. Ortner notes that the “cheap labor” 
function may violate the FLSA. Id. at 2620. 
 77. See Dunn, supra note 64, at 452.  
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degree on a firm statutory and regulatory framework, whereas 
the analysis under anti-discrimination statutes continues to 
develop chiefly through case law. 
1. VOLUNTEERS UNDER THE FLSA 
The Supreme Court explicitly addressed the employment 
status of volunteers in the 1985 decision Tony & Susan Alamo 
Foundation v. Secretary of Labor.78 In this case a nonprofit reli-
gious organization operated several commercial businesses, 
which it staffed with former addicts, criminals, and derelicts 
the organization had rehabilitated.79 The Foundation did not 
pay the workers wages or salary, but did provide food, shelter, 
clothing, transportation, and medical benefits.80 In considering 
whether the workers were employees under the FLSA, the 
Court relied upon the holding in Walling v. Portland Terminal 
Co.81 In that case, the Court ruled that the FLSA’s definition of 
“employ” as “suffer or permit to work” “was obviously not in-
tended to stamp all persons as employees who, without any ex-
press or implied compensation agreement, might work for their 
own advantage on the premises of another.”82 In contrast to the 
railroad trainees in Walling, however, the Court found that the 
Foundation’s volunteers “were ‘entirely dependent upon the 
Foundation for long periods [of time]’” because they received 
compensation in the form of significant benefits.83 The fact that 
the workers strongly protested their classification as employees 
held little weight for the Court.84 Although this decision raised 
concern about the potentially debilitating effects to charitable 
organizations that rely heavily upon volunteer work,85 the 
Court emphasized that the Department of Labor’s current ap-
proach would not transform services “of the kind typically asso-
 
 78. Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec’y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290 (1985). 
 79. Id. at 292.  
 80. Id. at 292–93. 
 81. Alamo Found., 471 U.S. at 299–300 (citing Walling v. Portland Ter-
minal Co., 330 U.S. 148, 150 (1947)).  
 82. Walling, 330 U.S. at 152 (citing the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 
29 U.S.C. § 203(g) (1946)).  
 83. Alamo Found., 471 U.S. at 301 (quoting Donovan v. Tony & Susan Al-
amo Found., 567 F. Supp. 556, 562 (W.D. Ark. 1982)). 
 84. Id. at 302. 
 85. See Dunn, supra note 64, at 458.  
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ciated with volunteer work”86 into labor protected by the 
FLSA.87 
The 1985 Amendments to the FLSA added a definition of 
“volunteer,” but the definition applies only to volunteers at pub-
lic agencies.88 The amendment allows volunteers at public 
agencies to receive reimbursed expenses, reasonable benefits, 
and nominal fees without becoming employees under the 
FLSA.89 FLSA regulations specify that allowable payments in-
clude: reimbursements for expenses; books, supplies, or other 
materials essential to volunteer training; coverage under group 
insurance plans, including health insurance, life insurance, 
disability insurance, worker’s compensation, and pension plans; 
and nominal fees not tied to productivity.90 These payments 
remain subject to an examination of “the total amount of pay-
ments made . . . in the context of the economic realities of the 
situation.”91 
As the Alamo Court noted, the Department of Labor con-
tinues to recognize “ordinary volunteerism” as falling outside 
the FLSA’s jurisdiction.92 In its Field Operation Handbook, the 
Department of Labor acknowledges that “the nature of reli-
gious, charitable and similar nonprofit organizations, and 
schools is such that individuals may volunteer their services in 
one capacity or another, usually on a part-time basis, not as 
employees or in contemplation of pay.”93 The Handbook lists 
several volunteer activities that are unlikely to trigger an em-
ployment relationship, including helping at a shelter, providing 
services for the sick and elderly, and working at a school li-
brary or cafeteria.94 
An entirely different set of standards applies to for-profit 
private sector employers. The FLSA prohibits for-profit busi-
nesses from accepting volunteer services unless the volunteer 
 
 86. Alamo Found., 471 U.S. at 303 n.25. 
 87. Id. at 302–03.  
 88. Pub. L. No. 99-150, § 4, 99 Stat. 787 (1985) (codified as amended at 29 
U.S.C. § 203(4)(A) (2012)).  
 89. Id.  
 90. 29 C.F.R. § 553.106 (2012).  
 91. Id. § 553.106(f). 
 92. Alamo Found., 471 U.S. at 302–03 & n.25. 
 93. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, FIELD OPERATIONS HANDBOOK 10b03(c) (1993), 
available at http://www.dol.gov/whd/FOH/FOH_Ch10.pdf [hereinafter FIELD 
OPERATIONS HANDBOOK].  
 94. Id.  
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meets the six criteria of an intern/trainee.95 These criteria at-
tempt to ensure that the work arrangement primarily benefits 
the intern rather than the employer and provides no immediate 
advantage to the employer.96 Establishing all six criteria can be 
difficult and theoretically should preclude private employers 
from utilizing “free labor.”97 Some scholars, however, suggest 
that although many employers classify unpaid interns as 
“trainees” under the FLSA, this classification often ignores the 
requirement that employers derive no advantage from the in-
tern.98 Moreover, this six-factor test is not binding on courts, 
and some courts elect not to use it.99 Among courts that do ap-
ply the test, only some require all six factors to avoid a finding 
of employee status.100 Others, like the Tenth Circuit, favor a 
“totality of the circumstances” approach that considers each 
factor but only requires most of them to demonstrate a worker 
is a legally unpaid intern.101 
2. VOLUNTEERS UNDER ANTI-DISCRIMINATION EMPLOYMENT 
STATUTES  
The circuit courts disagree over which test to apply when 
confronted with a volunteer or unpaid intern claiming employ-
 
 95. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, WAGE & HOUR DIV., FACT SHEET #71: INTERN-
SHIP PROGRAMS UNDER THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT 1 (2010) [hereinafter 
FACT SHEET #71], available at http://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/compliance/ 
whdfs71.pdf (listing the requirements for an unpaid internship as: (1) similar 
to training in an educational environment, (2) for the benefit of the intern, (3) 
does not displace regular employees, (4) employer derives no immediate ad-
vantage from intern’s activities, (5) intern not necessarily entitled to a job at 
internship’s conclusion, and (6) employer and intern understand that intern is 
not entitled to wages); see also Tip of the Month: Interns, Volunteers, and Em-
ployees: Are You in Compliance? (Proskauer Rose Emp’t Law Counseling & 
Training Practice Grp., New York, N. Y.), June 2011, available at  
http://www.proskauer.com/files/News/dc18a00a-d961-4da1-b275 
-37af8d1ef8d7/Presentation/NewsAttachment/73b0c435-5e26-483d-9bc0-
39cf5398adbe/Employment-Law-Counseling-Tip-of-the-Month-February-2014-
Update.pdf.  
 96. See FACT SHEET #71, supra note 95.  
 97. See Richard Tuschman, Using Volunteers and Interns: Is It Legal?, 
FORBES (Aug. 24, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/richardtuschman/2012/ 
08/24/using-volunteers-and-interns-is-it-legal.  
 98. See Ortner, supra note 60, at 2620. 
 99. David C. Yamada, The Legal and Social Movement Against Unpaid 
Internships 4–5 (Suffolk Univ. Law Sch., Research Paper No. 13-34, 2013), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2338646. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
BODTKE_4fmt 1/6/2015 3:00 PM 
2015] WHEN VOLUNTEERS BECOME EMPLOYEES 1127 
 
ee status.102 The majority of circuits use a threshold-
remuneration test that requires an initial showing of substan-
tial compensation before applying the multi-factor common law 
agency test.103 A minority of circuits treat remuneration as one 
of many non-dispositive factors that must be examined togeth-
er.104 
a. Threshold-Remuneration Test 
The leading case establishing the threshold-remuneration 
test is Graves v. Women’s Professional Rodeo Ass’n.105 The de-
fendant WPRA sanctioned rodeo barrel races that met its 
standards and required its members to adhere to certain rules 
when competing in its approved events.106 WPRA’s membership 
was restricted to females, and the plaintiff Graves, a male bar-
rel racer, brought a Title VII suit alleging sex discrimination.107 
WPRA defended the suit on the grounds that it did not have 
the requisite fifteen employees to fall under Title VII’s jurisdic-
tion.108 Graves contested that WPRA’s members were its em-
ployees.109 Rather than immediately initiating a common law 
agency analysis, the court consulted the dictionary definitions 
of “employee,” “employer,” and “employ” and found that 
“[c]entral to the meaning of these words is the idea of compen-
sation in exchange for services.”110 As a result, the court con-
cluded that compensation “is an essential condition to the ex-
istence of an employer-employee relationship” and that a multi-
factor common law or economic realities analysis should apply 
“only in situations that plausibly approximate an employment 
relationship.”111 Because WPRA’s members received no compen-
sation, their relationship did not plausibly rise to that between 
an employer and employee and a common law agency analysis 
was unnecessary.112 
 
 102. See Juino v. Livingston Parish Fire Dist. No. 5, 717 F.3d 431, 435 (5th 
Cir. 2013) (describing the circuit split over which test should be used to distin-
guish between volunteers and employees).  
 103. Id.  
 104. Id. 
 105. 907 F.2d 71 (8th Cir. 1990). 
 106. Id. at 72. 
 107. Id. at 71–72. 
 108. Id. at 72.  
 109. Id.  
 110. Id. at 73.  
 111. Id. at 73–74. 
 112. Id. at 73. Although the barrel race winners received a money prize, 
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The Second Circuit followed the Eighth Circuit’s reasoning 
in O’Connor v. Davis, where a student intern sued for sex dis-
crimination under Title VII.113 The court found application of 
the common law agency test to determine O’Connor’s employ-
ment status inappropriate “because it ignores the antecedent 
question of whether O’Connor was hired.”114 The court ruled 
that no hire occurred in this case, because O’Connor received 
no salary, wages, or benefits, nor was she promised such com-
pensation.115 As a result, the court found O’Connor was not an 
employee under Title VII.116  
Following Graves and O’Connor, several other courts of ap-
peals adopted the threshold-remuneration test in cases where a 
voluntarily unpaid worker claims employee status.117  
b. Compensation as a Non-dispositive Factor Within Common 
Law Agency Test 
The Sixth and Ninth Circuits have rejected the threshold-
remuneration test in favor of a common law test that includes 
compensation as one of several non-dispositive factors.118 In 
Bryson v. Middlefield Volunteer Fire Department, Inc., an em-
ployee of the Fire Department sued for sex discrimination un-
der Title VII.119 The Fire Department argued it was not an em-
ployer under Title VII because it did not have fifteen employees 
for the relevant time period.120 Bryson countered that the Fire 
Department’s firefighter-members were employees.121 The dis-
trict court applied the threshold-remuneration test and con-
cluded that the firefighters’ benefits did not constitute suffi-
 
non-WPRA members could also compete and receive the prize. Id. Moreover, 
the prize money did not come from WPRA, but rather from the sponsor of the 
particular rodeo and the competitors’ entry fees. Id.  
 113. 126 F.3d 112, 113–14 (2d Cir. 1997). 
 114. Id. at 115. 
 115. Id. at 116. 
 116. Id.  
 117. See Juino v. Livingston Parish Fire Dist. No. 5, 717 F.3d 431, 439 (5th 
Cir. 2013); Llampallas v. Mini-Circuits, Lab, Inc., 163 F.3d 1236, 1243–44 
(11th Cir. 1998); McGuinness v. Univ. of N.M. Sch. of Med., 170 F.3d 974, 979 
(10th Cir. 1998); Haavistola v. Cmty. Fire Co. of Rising Sun, 6 F.3d 211, 222 
(4th Cir. 1993). 
 118. See Bryson v. Middlefield Volunteer Fire Dep’t, Inc., 656 F.3d 348, 354 
(6th Cir. 2011); Waisgerber v. City of L.A., 406 F. App’x 150, 152 (9th Cir. 
2010); Fichman v. Media Ctr., 512 F.3d 1157, 1160 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 119. Bryson, 656 F.3d at 350.  
 120. Id. at 351. 
 121. Id. at 350–51. 
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cient compensation to raise a factual issue for the jury.122 The 
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed, finding the dis-
trict court’s adoption of the threshold-remuneration test in er-
ror.123  
In explaining its reversal, the court of appeals questioned 
the precedent on which the majority of circuits based its under-
standing of remuneration as an independent antecedent factor. 
The opinion criticized the O’Connor court’s reliance on the term 
“hired party” in Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid124 
as support for establishing a threshold requirement of substan-
tial compensation.125 The court instead emphasized the Reid 
Court’s instruction to apply the common law of agency “‘when 
Congress has used the term ‘employee’ without defining it,’”126 
observing that the instruction made no exception for cases lack-
ing remuneration.127 The court also noted that considering re-
muneration as one of several non-dispositive factors comported 
with Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Darden’s statement 
that “all of the incidents of the relationship must be assessed 
and weighed with no one factor being decisive.”128 The court re-
versed and remanded the case for further proceedings that 
weighed common law factors in addition to remuneration.129 
Legal commentators dispute the relative merits of the 
threshold-remuneration test versus treating remuneration as 
one of several non-dispositive factors. Mitchell Rubinstein ad-
vocates the uniform adoption of the threshold-remuneration 
test to determine whether a volunteer is an employee, empha-
sizing its practicality and adoption by the National Labor Rela-
tions Board (NLRB),130 the quasi-judicial body that decides cas-
 
 122. Id. at 351. 
 123. Id. at 353. 
 124. 490 U.S. 730, 751–52 (1989). 
 125. Bryson, 656 F.3d at 354; O’Connor v. Davis, 126 F.3d 112, 115 (2d Cir. 
1997).  
 126.  Bryson, 656 F.3d at 354 (quoting Reid, 490 U.S. at 739–40).  
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. (quoting Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 324 
(1992)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 129. Id. at 355–56. 
 130. Rubinstein, supra note 25, at 179. For an overview of the NLRB cases 
applying the same two-step test used in the threshold-remuneration test, see 
Northwestern Univ. & Coll. Athletes Players Ass’n, No. 13-RC-121359, slip op. 
at 13–17 (N.L.R.B. March 26, 2014), available at http://mynlrb.nlrb.gov/ 
link/document.aspx/09031d4581667b6f (analyzing compensation before ana-
lyzing control factors and concluding that only the football players receiving 
scholarships were employees under the Act); In re Seattle Opera Ass’n, 331 
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es under the NLRA in administrative proceedings.131 Christo-
pher Morgan, in contrast, argues that the Sixth and Ninth Cir-
cuits’ “all the factors” approach better accords with Supreme 
Court precedent.132 This debate represents an additional com-
plication to the already inconsistent and unpredictable legal 
framework for determining employee status. Because the mul-
ti-factor approach represents the status quo for determining 
employment status under Title VII and other federal employ-
ment statutes, this Note analyzes the reasons for and against 
diverging from that status quo with the threshold-
remuneration test. As the next Part will demonstrate, the 
threshold-remuneration test offers a potentially logical and 
clear test that overcomes much of the unpredictability inherent 
in the Sixth Circuit’s “all the factors” approach. The threshold-
remuneration test, however, needs a more precise definition of 
“remuneration” that accords with the FLSA in order to avoid 
becoming yet another indeterminate and inconsistent standard 
to decide employee status.  
II.  THE PROBLEMS OF THE THRESHOLD-
REMUNERATION TEST THREATEN TO UNDERMINE ITS 
BENEFITS   
This Part examines the advantages, criticisms, and defi-
ciencies of the threshold-remuneration test as a method to de-
termine the employment status of voluntarily unpaid workers. 
Section A discusses the threshold-remuneration test’s benefits 
of logic and efficiency in contrast to multi-factor tests’ incom-
patibility with volunteer situations and unpredictability. Sec-
tion B addresses and counters two leading criticisms of the 
threshold-remuneration test: (1) overemphasis on the Reid 
Court’s “hired party” language, and (2) violation of precedent. 
Section C then explains the more serious problems with the 
threshold-remuneration test: (1) an inconsistent definition of 
compensation, and (2) incongruity with the FLSA. This Part 
concludes that while the threshold-remuneration test offers a 
 
N.L.R.B. 1072, 1073 (2000) (examining remuneration before other factors in 
finding that auxiliary opera choristers were employees), aff’d, 292 F.3d 757 
(D.C. Cir. 2002); WBAI Pacifica Found., 328 N.L.R.B. 1273 (1999) (concluding 
that no employment relationship existed where there was no compensation for 
unpaid staff and that no further test needed to be applied). 
 131. The Board, NAT’L LABOR RELATIONS BD., http://www.nlrb.gov/ 
who-we-are/board (last visited Dec. 4, 2014). 
 132. Morgan, supra note 25, at 1234–35. 
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potential method to clarify the definition of “employee” in vol-
unteer contexts, it suffers from its failure to delineate the 
meaning of “remuneration” and its failure to coincide with the 
FLSA’s regulations for determining when a volunteer becomes 
an employee.  
A. THE THRESHOLD-REMUNERATION APPROACH REFOCUSES 
THE MEANING OF EMPLOYMENT AND SIMPLIFIES THE 
EMPLOYMENT STATUS DETERMINATION 
Case law suggests several reasons for applying the thresh-
old-remuneration test to volunteer situations. First, the 
threshold-remuneration test calls attention to the core feature 
of employment relationships: compensation. Second, the test 
recognizes that control, the focus of the common law agency 
test, loses its significance when compensation is not evident. 
Third, the threshold-remuneration approach simplifies the pro-
cess of identifying an employee by avoiding the multi-factor 
analysis when no plausible employment relationship exists. 
1. The Threshold-Remuneration Test Recognizes the 
Centrality of Compensation to the Employment Relationship 
The threshold-remuneration test emphasizes the im-
portance of compensation by making it an antecedent require-
ment to conducting a common law agency analysis. The Graves 
court developed this approach by consulting the dictionary def-
initions of “employee,” “employer,” and “employ” before diving 
immediately into a common law agency analysis.133 Analyzing 
the dictionary definitions, the court noted that “[c]entral to the 
meaning of these words is the idea of compensation in exchange 
for services.”134 The NLRB also referred to the dictionary defini-
tions of “employee” and “employ” in WBAI Pacifica Foundation, 
a case where unpaid staff claimed they should be included in a 
collective bargaining agreement under the NLRA.135 The NLRB 
relied on NLRB v. Town & Country Electric, where the Su-
preme Court looked to various dictionary definitions of “em-
ployee” in analyzing the NLRA.136 Because those dictionary def-
 
 133. Graves v. Women’s Prof’l Rodeo Ass’n, 907 F.2d 71, 72–73 (8th Cir. 
1990) (pointing out that statutory definitions’ “quite spartan and circular na-
ture . . . seem to leave no other route” than relying upon the words’ ordinary 
usage). 
 134. Graves, 907 F.2d at 73. 
 135. WBAI Pacifica Found., 328 N.L.R.B. at 1274.  
 136. NLRB v. Town & Country Elec., Inc., 516 U.S. 85, 90 (1995); WBAI 
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initions all included compensation, the NLRB concluded that 
an employment relationship requires an economic aspect.137 
This return to dictionary definitions clarifies the compli-
cated employee question by focusing on the fundamental mean-
ing of employment, whereas multi-factor tests disregard com-
pensation’s fundamental role by treating it as one of many 
factors. The ordinary meanings of “employee” and related 
words, as shown by dictionary definitions,138 indisputably fea-
ture compensation as a central component of the employment 
concept—not just a relevant element. Moreover, the dictionary 
definitions accord with societal perceptions of the distinction 
between volunteers and employees. As Ellis and Noyes’ defini-
tion of “volunteer” indicates,139 a key feature of volunteering is 
“no personal economic gain.”140 Employment, on the other hand, 
rests on an economic exchange.141 Without compensation, a re-
lationship shifts from one of economic exchange to one of freely 
offered services that generate their own intrinsic value.142  
Admittedly, in unpaid intern situations, the absence of 
monetary compensation does not automatically imply a disin-
terested donation without expectation of extrinsic reward.143 
 
Pacifica Found., 328 N.L.R.B. at 1274.  
 137. WBAI Pacifica Found., 328 N.L.R.B. at 1274–75. Mitchell Rubinstein 
argues that the NLRB essentially adopted the threshold-remuneration test in 
this case. Rubinstein, supra note 25, at 178.  
 138. Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary defines employee as “one em-
ployed by another usu[ally] for wages or salary and in a position below the ex-
ecutive level.” MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 408 (11th ed. 
2003). “Employ” is defined: “to use or engage the services of” and “to provide 
with a job that pays wages or a salary.” Id. Black’s Law Dictionary defines 
employee as a “person who works in the service of another person (the employ-
er) under an express or implied contract of hire, under which the employer has 
the right to control the details of work performance.” BLACK’S LAW DICTION-
ARY 602 (9th ed. 2009). Black’s Law Dictionary defines “hire” as “[t]o engage 
the labor or services of another for wages or other payment.” Id. at 799. 
 139. “To volunteer is to choose to act in recognition of a need, with an atti-
tude of social responsibility and without concern for monetary profit, going be-
yond one’s basic obligations.” ELLIS & NOYES, supra note 57, at 4.  
 140. Id. at 4–5.  
 141. See WBAI Pacifica Found., 328 N.L.R.B. at 1275 (“[T]o work for hire is 
to receive compensation for labor or services.”); James E. Brennan, Money 
Buys Labor, Not Love, COMPENSATION CAFÉ (July 10, 2013, 9:12 AM), http:// 
www.compensationcafe.com/2013/07/money-buys-labor-not-love.html (“[L]abor 
is purchased by money.”).  
 142. Cf. Brennan, supra note 141 (“Once a price-tag is placed on a task, it 
tends to be leached of intrinsic value. Involving money alters the transaction 
into a negotiation over extrinsic market terms.”). 
 143. See Ortner, supra note 60, at 2618 (arguing that college graduates 
find it challenging to gain full-time employment without internship experi-
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Unpaid interns labor in part out of the expectation of future 
economic returns.144 That being said, economic exchange is still 
lacking if the unpaid internship adheres to the Department of 
Labor regulation that an employer “derive[] no immediate ad-
vantage” from the intern’s activities.145 Because the FLSA-
compliant employer receives nothing, there is no exchange and 
therefore no compensation, which Black’s Law Dictionary de-
fines as “[r]emuneration and other benefits received in return 
for services rendered.”146 Thus, if the employer receives nothing 
in exchange for giving the intern job experience and career op-
portunities, no employment relationship exists. 
2. The Threshold-Remuneration Test Recognizes that Control 
Loses Significance when Compensation Is Absent 
In establishing compensation as a dispositive factor, the 
threshold-remuneration test appropriately adjusts the employ-
ee inquiry away from control in volunteer situations. Courts de-
termining employment status historically applied the common 
law agency test with its focus on control because most cases 
disputed whether an individual was an employee or independ-
ent contractor, a distinction where control is the defining fac-
tor.147 Yet, as the Haavistola court noted, “[c]ontrol loses some 
of its significance . . . in those situations in which compensation 
 
ence); Yamada, supra note 21, at 217 (noting that internship experience is es-
sentially required as part of a professional education). 
 144. See Greenhouse, supra note 75 (“[M]any college graduates who ex-
pected to land paid jobs are turning to unpaid internships to try to get a foot in 
an employer’s door.”); Michelle Hackeman, Many Students Debate the Value of 
Unpaid Internships, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE (July 14, 2013, 12:00 AM), 
http://www.post-gazette.com/hp_mobile/2013/07/14/Many-students-debate-the 
-value-of-unpaid-internships/stories/201307140181 (“[C]ollege students and 
employers have increasingly regarded internships as stepping stones on the 
way to full-time employment, so much so that the internship has come to re-
place a traditional entry-level position.”). 
 145. FACT SHEET #71, supra note 95, at 1. Commentators have noted, how-
ever, that this criterion is particularly difficult to establish, Tuschman, supra 
note 97, and that many employers classify their interns as non-employees even 
though the employer does derive benefit from the interns’ work, Ortner, supra 
note 60, at 2620. Others have criticized this criterion for disregarding unpaid 
internships’ long-term advantages to employers, including generating goodwill 
and training future employees on a cost-free basis. Craig Durrant, Comment, 
To Benefit or Not To Benefit: Mutually Induced Consideration As a Test for the 
Legality of Unpaid Internships, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 169, 178 (2013). 
 146. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 138, at 322 (emphasis added). 
 147. Haavistola v. Cmty. Fire Co. of Rising Sun, Inc., 6 F.3d 211, 220 (4th 
Cir. 1993); Smith v. Berks Cmty. Television, 657 F. Supp. 794, 795 (E.D. Pa. 
1987).  
BODTKE_4fmt 1/6/2015 3:00 PM 
1134 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [99:1113 
 
is not evident.”148 Control, as the Graves court observed, exists 
in many relationships that do not give rise to employment sta-
tus; a university, for example, exercises control over its stu-
dents, and a credit card company imposes rules on its card 
members.149 Volunteers also typically experience a high degree 
of control over their activities.150 Consequently, under a typical 
control test, even the most traditional, “pure” volunteer could 
meet the definition of employee, regardless of the absence of 
any expectation or receipt of compensation.151 Such an outcome 
disregards the centrality of compensation in the employment 
relationship152 and inflates the significance of control.  
Moreover, even though control clearly exists in volunteer 
contexts, its capacity for abuse by employers decreases in vol-
unteer situations. The court in Smith v. Berks Community Tel-
evision reasoned that because volunteers do not rely on the or-
ganization they serve for their livelihood, they “are not 
susceptible to the discriminatory practices which the Act [Title 
VII] was designed to eliminate.”153 Because a volunteer does not 
depend upon his or her volunteer work to pay the bills, the vol-
unteer holds greater bargaining power than a typical employee. 
For instance, the volunteer can leave the position without im-
mediate financial consequences, and in doing so deprive the 
employer of the benefits of free labor.154 Therefore, control in a 
pure volunteer context imposes fewer risks of ongoing discrimi-
nation than in an employment relationship, further diminish-
 
 148. Haavistola, 6 F.3d at 220.  
 149. Graves v. Women’s Prof’l Rodeo Ass’n, 907 F.2d 71, 73 (8th Cir. 1990). 
 150. See HERMAN, supra note 67, at 13–17 (describing strategies for man-
aging volunteer services, including providing explicit direction, supervising 
activities, and establishing policies).  
 151. Cf. Rubinstein, supra note 25, at 172 (“[S]imply because a volunteer in 
a hospital gift shop is directly under the control of an administrator . . . may 
say nothing with respect to whether or not he is an employee if he or she re-
ceives absolutely nothing in return.”). 
 152. See supra Part II.A.1.  
 153. Smith v. Berks Cmty. Television, 657 F. Supp. 794, 795 (E.D. Pa. 
1987). 
 154. See Peter J. Eide, Volunteers and Employment Law, in THE VOLUN-
TEER MANAGEMENT HANDBOOK 339, 340–41 (Tracy Daniel Connors ed., 1995). 
But see O’Connor v. Davis, 126 F.3d 112, 119 (2d Cir. 1997) (recognizing that 
student interns may not be “in quite the same position to simply walk away 
from . . . alleged harassment as are many other volunteers”); Kpere-Daibo, su-
pra note 21, at 148–50 (arguing that volunteers are vulnerable to discrimina-
tory behavior because their motives for volunteering may be strong enough to 
tolerate such abuse, and because employers are more likely to abuse unpaid 
workers because of their temporary status).  
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ing control’s importance to a test distinguishing between volun-
teers and employees. The threshold-remuneration test properly 
shifts the focus towards compensation and away from control, a 
factor that, while important to the employee-independent con-
tractor distinction, carries less weight in volunteer situations. 
3. The Threshold-Remuneration Test Avoids the 
Indeterminate Multi-factor Analysis  
Using remuneration as a dispositive factor not only recog-
nizes compensation’s centrality in the employment relationship 
but also simplifies the method of determining when an individ-
ual is an employee. If a plaintiff fails to establish sufficient re-
muneration, the court need not delve into an indeterminate test 
of non-weighted, non-dispositive factors.155 Such an approach 
enhances both judicial efficiency and predictability.156 Specifi-
cally, the court avoids a lengthy analysis of anywhere from six 
to thirteen additional factors if compensation is clearly ab-
sent.157 The test also improves predictability by clarifying when 
someone is clearly not an employee.158 Overall, the threshold-
remuneration lends much-needed clarity and certainty to the 
increasingly complicated question of employment status.  
Although the test’s adoption of one dispositive factor will 
prove determinative in only some circumstances, it still gener-
ates greater predictability than the existing scheme. Moreover, 
the threshold-remuneration test reorients courts to the funda-
mental definition of an “employee” by shifting the focus to com-
pensation rather than control in volunteer contexts. Despite the 
 
 155. See Graves v. Women’s Prof’l Rodeo Ass’n, 907 F.2d 71, 74 (8th Cir. 
1990).  
 156. See Rubinstein, supra note 25, at 179 (“The two-step approach of the 
NLRB seems to be the most practical test for distinguishing between volun-
teers and employees.”).  
 157. Compare Juino v. Livingston Parish Fire Dist. No. 5, 717 F.3d 431, 
439–40 (halting its analysis after finding the plaintiff’s benefits did not consti-
tute sufficient remuneration), with Fichman v. Media Ctr., 512 F.3d 1157, 
1160–61 (9th Cir. 2008) (analyzing six factors in addition to remuneration 
even after finding the putative employees did not receive substantial compen-
sation).  
 158. See Rubinstein, supra note 25, at 154 (“When volunteers receive abso-
lutely nothing in return, courts do not seem to have much difficulty in conclud-
ing that they are volunteers . . . .”); Castagnera et al., supra note 16 (recom-
mending that human resources keep careful track of all forms of compensation 
for volunteers); Stephen M. Flanagan, Tip of the Month: Employment Laws 
and Interns, 31 No. 7 FLETCHER CORP. L. ADVISER 14 (July 2013) (“The key[] 
for employers to avoid turning interns into employees . . . [is] . . . no or insig-
nificant remuneration . . . .”). 
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threshold-remuneration test’s practical adoption of one disposi-
tive factor, the test has received criticism about its precedential 
basis. Moreover, the test continues to suffer from inconsistency 
in application and incongruity with the major federal employ-
ment statute addressing compensation: the FLSA.  
B. THE THRESHOLD-REMUNERATION TEST NEITHER OVER-
EMPHASIZES REID’S “HIRED” LANGUAGE NOR VIOLATES 
PRECEDENT 
Despite the threshold-remuneration test’s logic and com-
parative simplicity in defining the employment relationship, it 
has not escaped criticism. The Sixth Circuit refused to adopt 
the threshold-remuneration approach on the grounds that oth-
er circuits overemphasized the substantive meaning of “hired 
party” as used by the Supreme Court.159 Some courts and schol-
ars similarly challenge the threshold-remuneration’s preceden-
tial foundation, pointing out that prior Supreme Court deci-
sions assert no one factor is decisive in analyzing the 
employment relationship.160 These criticisms, however, misin-
terpret Supreme Court precedent and overlook the logical 
foundations of the threshold-remuneration test.  
1. The Threshold-Remuneration Test Does Not Over-
Emphasize the Term “Hired Party”  
In Bryson v. Middlefield Volunteer Fire Department, the 
Sixth Circuit questioned the majority’s reasoning for adopting 
remuneration as an “independent antecedent inquiry.”161 The 
court disagreed with O’Connor that the term “hired party” in 
key Supreme Court cases distinguishing employees from inde-
pendent contractors162 signified anything substantive about the 
meaning of “employee” or the role of remuneration.163 The Sixth 
Circuit pointed out that the Reid Court defined “hiring party” 
purely in terms of the Copyright Act as “‘the party who claims 
ownership of the copyright by virtue of the work for hire doc-
 
 159. Bryson v. Middlefield Volunteer Fire Dept., Inc., 656 F.3d 348, 354 
(6th Cir. 2011). 
 160. Id.; Morgan, supra note 25, at 1234–35. 
 161. Bryson, 656 F.3d at 353. 
 162. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318 (1992); Cmty. for 
Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730 (1989); O’Connor v. Davis, 126 
F.3d 112, 115 (2d Cir. 1997). 
 163. Bryson, 656 F.3d at 354. 
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trine.’”164 Such a definition, the Sixth Circuit reasoned, under-
cut any inference that the term “hired party” carries any mean-
ingful weight outside the Copyright Act.165  
The Sixth Circuit’s interpretation, however, views “hired 
party” too narrowly and overlooks the consistent logic of requir-
ing a “hire” before engaging in a full-fledged application of the 
common law test. First, the Bryson court dismissed the Su-
preme Court’s application of the “hired party” language to a 
case outside the scope of the Copyright Act in Darden, where 
the statute at issue was ERISA.166 Although the term “hired 
party” originated from the Copyright Act, the Supreme Court 
did not hesitate to transfer the language or concept to other 
employment contexts. Second, the Bryson court failed to recog-
nize the rudimentary meaning of “hire” and its presumed exist-
ence in both employee and independent contractor contexts. 
“Hire” means “[t]o engage the labor or services of another for 
wages or other payment.”167 Both an employee and an inde-
pendent contractor in the vast majority of cases meet this defi-
nition.168 The common law agency test itself assumes this base-
line with the factor “method of payment.”169 This factor 
presumes the existence of compensation and delineates be-
tween employees and independent contractors solely upon the 
method by which such compensation is paid.170 In volunteer 
contexts, however, courts cannot similarly presume the exist-
ence of compensation or a hire.171 A preliminary investigation 
into whether a “hire” has even occurred simply recognizes the 
assumption under which courts already determine employee 
status. The Sixth Circuit, by over-analyzing the origins of the 
term “hired party,” fails to recognize its broader use by the Su-
preme Court and its logical role in defining “employee.” 
 
 164. Id. (quoting Reid, 490 U.S. at 738 n.6). 
 165. Id.  
 166. Id.; Darden, 503 U.S. at 323–24.  
 167. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 138, at 799.  
 168. See Rubinstein, supra note 17, at 618–19 (“Outside cases involving 
volunteers, there is usually no issue with respect to whether a hiring took 
place or whether remuneration is received.”).  
 169. See Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 751 (1989). 
 170. See BALES ET AL., supra note 10, at 9. 
 171. See Rubinstein, supra note 25, at 172 (“[T]he employment status of 
volunteers has very little to do with the issue of whether or not someone is an 
independent contractor.”).  
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2. The Threshold-Remuneration Test Does Not Violate 
Precedent 
In rejecting the threshold-remuneration test, the Sixth 
Circuit relied on the Supreme Court’s assertion in Reid that 
“when Congress has used the term ‘employee’ without defining 
it, we have concluded that Congress intended to describe the 
conventional master-servant relationship as understood by 
common-law agency doctrine.”172 The Ninth Circuit similarly 
noted in opting out of the threshold-remuneration test173 the 
Supreme Court’s statement in Clackamas that the outcome of 
common law test depends on “‘all of the incidents of the rela-
tionship . . . with no one factor being decisive.’”174 Morgan ar-
gues that the Supreme Court provided a directive in Clackamas 
that all employment factors must be analyzed together with no 
one factor being dispositive.175 Morgan further points out that 
the Clackamas Court included remuneration as one of six fac-
tors to determine the alleged employees’ status in that case, ar-
guing therefore that remuneration cannot be an antecedent re-
quirement.176 These criticisms raise the question whether the 
threshold-remuneration test ignores binding precedent.177 
Such criticism, however, misinterprets the import of the 
Clackamas decision. Rather than compelling an all-the-factors 
approach, the decision recognizes the legitimacy of adopting a 
new test for a novel situation. In Clackamas, the Court ad-
dressed whether four physician-shareholders of a medical clinic 
were employees, acknowledging that professional corporations 
have “no exact precedent in the common law.”178 As a result, the 
Court adopted six new factors promulgated by the EEOC to an-
alyze the narrow and novel question of whether a shareholder 
is an employee.179 This divergence from the traditional list of 
 
 172. Reid, 490 U.S. at 739–40; Bryson v. Middlefield Volunteer Fire Dept., 
Inc., 656 F.3d 348, 354 (6th Cir. 2011). 
 173. Fichman v. Media Ctr., 512 F.3d 1157, 1160 (9th Cir. 2008); Morgan, 
supra note 25, at 1232. 
 174. Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 451 
(2003) (quoting Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 324 (1992)). 
 175. Morgan, supra note 25, at 1238.  
 176. Id. 
 177. See id. at 1239 (noting the “all the factors” test “comports with Su-
preme Court precedent and should therefore be given more credence”).  
 178. Clackamas, 538 U.S. at 442, 447.  
 179. Id. at 448–49. The six new factors were: (1) whether the organization 
can hire or fire the individual or set the rules and regulations of the individu-
al’s work; (2) whether and to what extent the organization supervises the indi-
vidual’s work; (3) whether the individual reports to someone higher in the or-
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factors indicates the Supreme Court’s recognition that new, 
modified tests are appropriate for scenarios outside the typical 
employee-independent contractor distinction.180 The Clackamas 
test, although rooted in agency law, represents a modification 
of the Supreme Court’s past application of the common law 
agency test. In this particular situation, the Court adhered to 
the non-dispositive all-the-factors approach that Morgan char-
acterizes as binding, but the Court’s willingness to adjust its 
analysis for non-traditional employment situations reveals that 
traditional multi-factor tests may not be binding in volunteer 
contexts.181  
Morgan further argues, however, that because the Clack-
amas Court specifically included remuneration—defined as 
“whether the individual shares in the profits, losses, and liabili-
ties”—as one of its non-dispositive factors, precedent bars mak-
ing remuneration an antecedent requirement.182 This interpre-
tation, however, overlooks the fact that “remuneration” as 
defined in Clackamas weighed against a finding of employment 
for the shareholders.183 The Court was not inquiring as to the 
preliminary existence of payment, but as to how this payment 
was calculated: as a salary, or as a share of the company’s prof-
its.184 Thus, including the sharing of profits as a non-dispositive 
factor in the Clackamas analysis hardly precludes courts from 
treating basic remuneration as a threshold factor.  
C. THE THRESHOLD-REMUNERATION APPROACH FAILS TO 
DEFINE “REMUNERATION” AND GENERATES RESULTS 
INCONSISTENT WITH THE FLSA 
Although the threshold-remuneration test overcomes these 
critiques of its precedential foundation, other, yet unacknowl-
edged problems exist with the test that could undercut its bene-
 
ganization; (4) whether and to what extent the individual is able to influence 
the organization; (5) whether the parties intended that the individual be an 
employee, as expressed in written agreements or contracts; and (6) whether 
the individual shared in the profits, losses, and liabilities of the organization. 
Id. at 449–50. 
 180. Rubinstein, supra note 25, at 173.  
 181. See id. 
 182. Morgan, supra note 25, at 1238. 
 183. Clackamas, 538 U.S. at 450–51 (“Some of the District Court’s findings 
. . . appear to weigh in favor of a conclusion that the four director-shareholder 
physicians in this case are not employees of the clinic. For example . . . they 
share the profits . . . .”).  
 184. See id.  
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fits of logic and efficiency. First, it remains unclear what con-
stitutes significant remuneration,185 both because courts tend to 
apply the standard differently186 and because new factual sce-
narios likely will arise.187 Second, the threshold-remuneration 
presents the same problematic phenomenon as many other 
tests in the employment arena that find an employment rela-
tionship under one statute but not another.188 
1. The Definition of “Significant Remuneration” Is Unclear 
The threshold-remuneration test suffers from an unclear 
definition of “remuneration.” The Fourth Circuit observed in 
Haavistola that “compensation is not defined by statute or case 
law.”189 The Juino court, in contrast, offered a definition of re-
muneration as “either direct compensation, such as a salary or 
wages, or indirect benefits that are not merely incidental to the 
activity performed.”190 Even this definition, however, produces 
uncertainty. Partly as a result of little precedent and partly be-
cause of courts’ reluctance to draw definite lines around the 
remunerative concept, the threshold-remuneration “test pro-
vides very little guidance in its practical application.”191  
Some case comparisons demonstrate this unpredictability. 
In two similar cases involving volunteer firefighters, one plain-
tiff established employment status192 while the other did not.193 
 
 185. See Rubinstein, supra note 25, at 157 (noting that “each case is fact 
specific”); Gwinn Clay, supra note 19 (considering several hypothetical varia-
tions of the factual scenario in Juino and concluding “we don’t know” what 
meets the threshold of remuneration). 
 186. Compare O’Connor v. Davis, 126 F.3d 112, 116 (2d Cir. 1997) (analyz-
ing whether the plaintiff received a salary, wages, or benefits), with Rafi v. 
Thompson, No. 02-2356, 2006 WL 3091483, at *1 (D.D.C. Oct. 30, 2006) (ana-
lyzing whether the volunteer position afforded future career opportunities 
with the employer). 
 187. See Rubinstein, supra note 25, at 179 (predicting the two-step test 
may be difficult to apply in certain scenarios). 
 188. See, e.g., Seattle Opera v. NLRB, 292 F.3d 757, 776–77 (D.C. Cir. 
2002) (Randolph, J., dissenting) (noting that the majority’s finding of an em-
ployment relationship under the NLRA incorrectly necessitated that the em-
ployer violated federal tax laws and the Fair Labor Standards Act); DUNLOP 
COMMISSION, supra note 20 (recognizing that “each major labor and employ-
ment statute . . . has its own definition of employee”). 
 189. Haavistola v. Cmty. Fire Co. of Rising Sun, 6 F.3d 211, 221 (4th Cir. 
1993). 
 190. Juino v. Livingston Parish Fire Dist. No. 5, 717 F.3d 431, 435 (5th Cir. 
2013). 
 191. Gwinn Clay, supra note 19.  
 192. Pietras v. Bd. of Fire Comm’rs of Farmingville Fire Dist., 180 F.3d 
468, 473 (2d Cir. 1999). 
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Although this difference may be partly attributable to proce-
dural differences (one case was decided by bench trial194 and the 
other by jury trial195), it still indicates the malleability of “re-
muneration.” In these two cases, the plaintiffs’ indirect benefits 
overlapped in three categories (disability insurance, life insur-
ance, and death benefits), and each also received other benefits 
beyond those they shared.196 Yet only one plaintiff was found to 
be an employee.197  
A possible explanation for this difference is the court’s 
opinion in Pietras that the plaintiff’s retirement pension repre-
sented a “considerably more generous” benefit than what the 
plaintiff in Haavistola received.198 It remains unclear, however, 
why Haavistola’s numerous benefits, which exceeded in num-
ber the benefits Pietras received, failed to make up for the re-
tirement pension. Without guidance from more cases, employ-
ers and volunteers will have difficulty predicting whether a 
plaintiff in Haavistola’s position is an employee, or whether a 
plaintiff that receives a retirement pension but nothing else can 
establish employment status. Most likely, courts will continue 
to reach different outcomes and foster employment law’s noto-
riously indeterminate stance on employee status.199  
Courts have also been inconsistent in cases where the pu-
tative employee/volunteer receives cash payments. For exam-
ple, the court in Juino interpreted $2 per call, amounting to 
$78200 over the course of Juino’s four-month tenure,201 as “purely 
 
 193. Haavistola v. Cmty. Fire Co. of Rising Sun, 839 F. Supp. 372, 373 (D. 
Md. 1994). 
 194. Pietras, 180 F.3d at 470. 
 195. Haavistola, 839 F. Supp. at 373. 
 196. Pietras, 180 F.3d at 471; Haavistola v. Cmty. Fire Co. of Rising Sun, 6 
F.3d 211, 221 (4th Cir. 1993).  
 197. Pietras, 180 F.3d at 473; Haavistola, 839 F. Supp. at 373. 
 198. Pietras, 180 F.3d at 473 & n.6; cf. Morgan, supra note 25, at 20 (draw-
ing a distinction between benefits that have no immediate value, like life in-
surance or disability insurance, and benefits that provide more immediate fi-
nancial gain, like a retirement pension).  
 199. For a more recent division between courts on what “significant remu-
neration” means, compare Finkle v. Howard Cnty., Md., CIV. No. JKB-13-
3236, 2014 WL 1396386, at *5 (D. Md. Apr. 10, 2014) (finding disability and 
life insurance to be significant remuneration even though such benefits accrue 
only upon injury or death), with Holder v. Town of Bristol, No. 3:09–CV–32 
PPS, 2009 WL 3004552, at *5 (N.D. Ind. Sept. 17, 2009) (finding similar “line-
of-duty” benefits insufficient because they “are not guaranteed forms of remu-
neration”). 
 200. Juino v. Livingston Parish Fire Dist. No. 5, 717 F.3d 431, 431, 439 
(5th Cir. 2013). 
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incidental to her volunteer service.”202 In contrast, the D.C. Cir-
cuit203 in Seattle Opera v. NLRB found that auxiliary choristers 
who received a flat sum of $214 per production received com-
pensation sufficient to give rise to employment status.204 Alt-
hough at first glance the difference between $78 and $214 ap-
pears substantial, the choristers’ $214 payment covered seven 
music rehearsals, seven stage rehearsals, and eight perfor-
mances, which amounted to seventy-seven hours of work, at a 
rate of $2.78 an hour.205 Thus, the amount the choristers re-
ceived per hour only slightly exceeded the amount Juino re-
ceived per call. Regardless of this comparable payment, the 
choristers established employee status, while Juino did not. 
Even assuming each of Juino’s fire calls lasted three hours, 
representing payment of $0.66 per hour, there would be only a 
$2 difference per hour from the choristers’ rate of pay. It is un-
clear where within that $2 range an individual shifts from vol-
unteer to employee. Such uncertainty contributes to the envi-
ronment of unpredictability in which employers and volunteers 
operate. 
An additional inconsistency in defining “remuneration” is 
the question of whether non-financial benefits constitute com-
pensation. In In re Seattle Opera Ass’n, the NLRB based its 
holding that the auxiliary choristers were employees partly on 
the fact that performing as an auxiliary chorister often led to 
becoming a paid regular chorister.206 The plaintiff in Rafi v. 
Thompson similarly made a preliminary showing of employee 
status when he demonstrated that a volunteer position at the 
National Institute of Health provided a clear pathway to em-
ployment at the Institute, as well as the training necessary to 
fulfill the requirements of the American Board of Medical Ge-
 
 201. Brief of Appellant at 4, Juino v. Livingston Parish Fire Dist. No. 5, 
717 F.3d 431 (5th Cir. 2013) (No. 12-30274), 2012 WL 3023864.  
 202. Juino, 717 F.3d at 440. 
 203. Although the D.C. Circuit has neither explicitly adopted nor rejected 
the threshold-remuneration test, it appeared to follow the NLRB’s example 
and adopt the threshold-remuneration test in Seattle Opera. Rubinstein, supra 
note 25, at 178–79. 
 204. Seattle Opera v. N.L.R.B., 292 F.3d 757, 764–65 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
 205. Id. at 773.  
 206. In re Seattle Opera Ass’n, 331 N.L.R.B. 148, 1073 (2000), aff’d, 292 
F.3d 757 (D.C. Cir. 2002). In affirming this decision, the D.C. Circuit did not 
rely on career opportunities to establish the presence of compensation, focus-
ing solely on the $214 flat fee. Seattle Opera, 292 F.3d at 762–63. 
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netics.207 The EEOC also supports this broader interpretation of 
remuneration. The EEOC states that a volunteer may be cov-
ered under Title VII if the volunteer work is required for regu-
lar employment or regularly leads to employment with the 
same entity.208  
With more courts indicating that non-financial benefits 
like education, work experience, and job opportunities consti-
tute compensation, the definition of remuneration becomes 
even more blurred. This trend of including non-financial bene-
fits within the definition of compensation further begs the 
question which non-financial benefits should constitute signifi-
cant remuneration, and which should be considered merely “in-
cidental” benefits209 or emotional rewards,210 neither of which 
weigh in favor of an employment relationship. Uncertainty on 
this issue exacerbates the unpredictable legal framework for 
determining employee status. In order for the threshold-
remuneration test to deliver its potential benefits of logic and 
simplicity, courts must clarify the meaning of “remuneration.”  
2. The Test Generates Inconsistency Between the FLSA and 
Other Employment Statutes 
Another problem with the threshold-remuneration test is 
its potential for inconsistency with the FLSA, the employment 
statute that itself regulates employee compensation.211 Judge 
Randolph recognized this difficulty in his dissenting opinion in 
Seattle Opera.212 Judge Randolph asserted that, based on the 
majority’s finding of the choristers to be employees, the Opera’s 
 
 207. Rafi v. Thompson, No. 02-2356, 2006 WL 3091483, at *1 (D.D.C. Oct. 
30, 2006); see also Holder v. Town of Bristol, No. 3:09–CV–32 PPS, 2009 WL 
3004552, at *6 (N.D. Ind. Sept. 17, 2009) (“[N]on-financial benefits could es-
tablish an employment relationship in the right context.”); Neff v. Civil Air Pa-
trol, 916 F. Supp. 710, 714 (S.D. Ohio 1996) (noting that education may consti-
tute compensation).  
 208. EQUAL OPPORTUNITY EMP’T COMM’N, EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 2 
(2009), http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/threshold.html#2-III-A-1-c; Title VII: 
Vaccination Policies, Covered Entities, Religious Accommodation, U.S. EQUAL 
EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION (Nov. 2, 2012), http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/ 
foia/letters/2012/religious_accommodation_and_vaccination.html. 
 209. Juino v. Livingston Parish Fire Dist. No. 5, 717 F.3d 431, 435 (5th Cir. 
2013). 
 210. Neff, 916 F. Supp. at 713. But see Kpere-Daibo, supra note 21, at 150–
51 (arguing that the motive to give back to society is “praiseworthy and should 
be promoted by society and its laws”).  
 211. See Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206 (2012). 
 212. Seattle Opera v. N.L.R.B., 292 F.3d 757, 777 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (Ran-
dolph, J., dissenting).  
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clear understanding of the choristers as volunteers213 amounted 
to nothing more than a “charade” that theoretically put the 
Opera in violation of the FLSA and federal tax laws.214 As 
Judge Randolph noted, however, whether the choristers would 
find protection under the FLSA is highly questionable. The De-
partment of Labor regulations specifically acknowledge that re-
imbursement for “approximate out-of-pocket expenses,” like 
that in Seattle Opera, does not cause a volunteer to become an 
employee.215 Because this regulation technically applies only to 
volunteers at public agencies,216 it might not cover the auxiliary 
choristers of a not-for-profit company like the Opera. Even so, 
Judge Randolph argued that Walling v. Portland Terminal Co. 
would, on its own, likely prevent the auxiliary choristers from 
establishing employment status under the FLSA.217 According 
to Judge Randolph, the auxiliary choristers resembled the rail-
road trainees in Walling since they too were not being compen-
sated for the work performed and had no expectation of com-
pensation.218 The majority, however, dismissed this reliance on 
Walling because Walling was interpreting the FLSA rather 
than the NLRA (the statute at issue in Seattle Opera).219 This 
application of Walling suggests that divergent conclusions re-
garding employee status could result under different employ-
ment statutes. Such an application, however, perpetrates the 
problem of inconsistency across employment statutes.220 
This problem plays out even more clearly in Pietras.221 
Pietras was a volunteer firefighter for the Farmingville Fire 
District, a public agency.222 The Second Circuit held that 
Pietras’ receipt of certain benefits gave rise to an employment 
relationship under Title VII.223 Those same benefits, however, 
would not have made Pietras an employee under the FLSA. 
 
 213. Id.  
 214. Id. 
 215. 29 C.F.R. § 553.106(b) (2012). The Opera claimed that the $214 repre-
sented reimbursement for out-of-pocket costs associated with transportation 
and parking. Seattle Opera, 292 F.3d at 762–63. 
 216. 29 C.F.R. § 553.101(a).  
 217. Seattle Opera, 292 F.3d at 774.  
 218. Id.  
 219. See id. at 762 & n.4. 
 220. See DUNLOP COMMISSION, supra note 20.  
 221. Pietras v. Bd. of Fire Comm’rs of Farmingville Fire Dist., 180 F.3d 468 
(2d Cir. 1999). 
 222. Id. at 470–71.  
 223. Id. at 473. 
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The FLSA regulations explicitly provide that “individuals do 
not lose their volunteer status if they are provided reasonable 
benefits by a public agency for whom they perform volunteer 
services.”224 The regulations go on to list benefits that would be 
considered reasonable, including health insurance, life insur-
ance, disability insurance, workers’ compensation, and pension 
plans.225 Under this standard, Pietras’ receipt of a retirement 
pension, life insurance, death benefits, disability insurance, 
and some medical benefits226 would almost certainly not entitle 
her to protection under the FLSA. Yet this same combination of 
benefits constituted sufficient remuneration under the thresh-
old-remuneration test.227 Therefore, while Pietras is an employ-
ee under Title VII, she likely would not be under the FLSA. 
Such a disconnect between employment statutes undercuts the 
threshold-remuneration test’s simplicity and perpetuates the 
potential for inconsistent results in determining employment 
status across employment statutes.228 In order to preserve its 
potential for clarifying employee status in volunteer contexts, 
the threshold-remuneration test should incorporate consistency 
with the FLSA. 
The threshold-remuneration test offers several benefits 
lacking in traditional multi-factor tests. Its focus on compensa-
tion rather than control better addresses the core distinction 
between employees and volunteers. Its establishment of an an-
tecedent requirement eliminates some of the uncertainty in-
herent in multi-factor analyses. The threshold-remuneration 
approach’s problems, however, may undermine its advantages. 
The test’s failure to define remuneration consistently and to ac-
cord with the FLSA generates additional unpredictability and 
discrepancy in determining who is and is not an employee.  
III.  COURTS SHOULD MODIFY THE THRESHOLD-
REMUNERATION TEST TO DEFINE REMUNERATION 
AND CORRESPOND WITH THE FLSA   
To effectuate the threshold-remuneration test’s benefits, 
courts applying the test should articulate a clearer definition of 
remuneration that also corresponds to the FLSA. Section A out-
 
 224. 29 C.F.R. § 553.106(d) (2012). 
 225. Id. 
 226. Pietras, 180 F.3d at 471. 
 227. Id. at 473. 
 228. See DUNLOP COMMISSION, supra note 20; Rubinstein, supra note 17, at 
628 & nn.120–21.  
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lines how FLSA triggers for compensation and definitions of 
“significant” compensation would operate to distinguish be-
tween employees and volunteers if incorporated into the 
threshold-remuneration test. Section B explains why applying 
FLSA standards to cases arising under Title VII and other anti-
discrimination employment statutes is appropriate and logical. 
Section C addresses anticipated counter-arguments to the pro-
posed solution. This Part concludes that the FLSA’s three-
tiered regulatory framework for determining the employment 
status of volunteers and unpaid interns offers a clear and logi-
cal method for courts to judge whether a volunteer is (or legally 
should be) receiving significant remuneration under the 
threshold-remuneration test.  
A. MECHANICS: HOW COURTS SHOULD APPLY FLSA STANDARDS 
TO THE THRESHOLD-REMUNERATION TEST 
The Department of Labor has articulated definite stand-
ards for determining the FLSA employment status of volun-
teers for public agencies in the Code of Federal Regulations229 
and of unpaid interns in the Wage and Hour Division’s Fact 
Sheet.230 Although the standards for volunteers at not-for-profit 
private entities are less precise, the Supreme Court decisions in 
Walling231 and Tony & Susan Alamo Foundation,232 in combina-
tion with the Department of Labor’s guidelines,233 provide the 
necessary framework for evaluating what constitutes compen-
sation for volunteers at not-for-profit companies.  
Courts applying the threshold-remuneration test to volun-
teers at public agencies should hold in accordance with the 
FLSA regulations that individuals who perform service for “civ-
ic, charitable, or humanitarian reasons, without promise, ex-
pectation or receipt of compensation for services rendered”234 
“may be paid expenses, reasonable benefits, a nominal fee, or 
any combination thereof, for their service without losing their 
 
 229. 29 C.F.R. §§ 553.100–.106. 
 230. FACT SHEET #71, supra note 95. Several courts apply these standards 
when determining the employment status of unpaid interns. See Glatt v. Fox 
Searchlight Pictures, Inc., No. 11 Civ. 6784 (WHP), 2013 WL 2495140, at *11 
(S.D.N.Y. June 11, 2013) for a recent and highly publicized application of the 
standards. 
 231. Walling v. Portland Terminal, 330 U.S. 148 (1947). 
 232. Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec’y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290 (1985). 
 233. FIELD OPERATIONS HANDBOOK, supra note 93.  
 234. 29 C.F.R. § 553.101(a). 
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status as volunteers.”235 The courts should further rely upon the 
FLSA regulations’ delineation of what constitutes permissible 
reimbursements, reasonable benefits, and nominal fees.236 The 
regulations do not address whether future job opportunities 
represent a benefit that creates an employment relationship. 
Based on the six criteria for unpaid interns, however, it ap-
pears that the potential for a future job should not trigger 
FLSA obligations. One of the required criterion for an intern to 
maintain unpaid status is that the intern “is not necessarily 
entitled to a job at the conclusion of the internship,” not that 
there is no potential whatsoever for a job.237 Since unpaid in-
terns are viewed with greater scrutiny than traditional volun-
teers,238 it seems that this allowance for unpaid interns should 
apply to volunteers at public agencies as well. 
For unpaid workers donating services to for-profit compa-
nies, including unpaid interns, courts applying the threshold-
remuneration test should analyze whether the unpaid worker 
is entitled to compensation under the six-factor test promulgat-
ed by the Department of Labor.239 In other words, if the em-
ployer derives an immediate advantage from the intern’s work 
or fails to satisfy one of the other factors, the unpaid intern 
should be an employee under both the FLSA and the threshold-
remuneration test, even if he or she received no wages or indi-
rect benefits. This interpretation allows an intern to gain pro-
tection under Title VII and other anti-discrimination statutes 
as long as they are entitled to compensation under the FLSA. 
Because the employee would have been receiving wages had 
the employer complied with the law, the employee should be 
able to satisfy the requirement of significant remuneration. The 
requirement that the intern is “not necessarily entitled to a job 
at the conclusion of the internship” also makes clear that the 
mere possibility of a future job will not create an employment 
relationship.240 
For volunteers at not-for-profit companies, courts adopting 
the threshold-remuneration test should follow precedent in 
 
 235. Id. § 553.106(a).  
 236. Id. § 553.106(b)–(f); supra notes 90 and 91 and accompanying text. 
 237. FACT SHEET #71, supra note 95. 
 238. See Fair Labor Standards Act Advisor: Volunteers, supra note 66 (dis-
cussing the different standards for volunteers at public agencies versus not-
for-profit enterprises and for-profit companies). 
 239. FACT SHEET #71, supra note 95. 
 240. See id. 
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Walling and Alamo in determining when benefits constitute 
significant remuneration. The Walling Court ruled that the 
FLSA is not meant to cover “each person who, without promise 
or expectation of compensation, but solely for his personal pur-
pose or pleasure, worked in activities carried on by other per-
sons . . . .”241 The Walling decision further clarified that the po-
tential for a future job alone will not establish an employment 
relationship, since the railroad trainees had clear potential for 
a job at the conclusion of the training but were not held to be 
employees.242 Finally, the Alamo ruling suggested that only 
compensation creating economic dependence would create em-
ployee status for volunteer work done in a nonprofit’s commer-
cial enterprise.243 Because this precedent still contains some 
gaps,244 courts should consult the FLSA regulations for volun-
teers at public agencies in determining what constitutes per-
missible reimbursed expenses and nominal fees. Since the De-
partment of Labor premised these regulations on Congress’s 
intention not “to discourage or impede volunteer activities for 
civic, charitable, or humanitarian purposes,”245 using the public 
agency volunteer regulations in a not-for-profit context should 
be permissible since it upholds Congressional purpose to avoid 
discouraging traditional volunteerism.  
B. TRANSFERRING FLSA DEFINITIONS OF REMUNERATION TO 
THE THRESHOLD-REMUNERATION TEST IS APPROPRIATE AND 
LOGICAL 
Precedent exists for transferring standards developed un-
der one employment statute to another. For example, in Smith 
v. City of Jackson, the Supreme Court found that because Title 
VII provided for a disparate impact claim, the Age Discrimina-
tion in Employment Act (ADEA) should as well since its lan-
guage and purpose closely resemble Title VII’s.246 Courts have 
also looked to the NLRA, the “grandparent of most labor 
 
 241. Walling v. Portland Terminal Co., 330 U.S. 148, 152 (1947). 
 242. Id. at 150.  
 243. Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec’y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 301 
(1985). 
 244. For example, neither these cases nor the regulatory guidance explicit-
ly address the status of reimbursed expenses or stipends for volunteers in 
nonprofit enterprises, both of which are relatively common. See ELLIS & 
NOYES, supra note 57, at 3.  
 245. 29 C.F.R. § 553.101(b) (2012). 
 246. Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 235–40 (2005). 
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laws,”247 for guidance in interpreting other employment laws.248 
Courts interpreting the NLRA, in turn, have considered the 
FLSA in determining individuals’ employee status. In WBAI 
Pacifica Foundation, the NLRB determined that volunteers’ el-
igibility for reimbursed travel expenses and childcare allowanc-
es did not demonstrate sufficient compensation to establish an 
employment relationship, noting that such evidence would fail 
to trigger FLSA obligations.249 These examples demonstrate 
that courts interpreting a particular employment law consult 
other employment statutes and sometimes borrow the stand-
ards developed under those statutes. Applying the FLSA defini-
tions and triggers for compensation to anti-discrimination em-
ployment statutes would not diverge from precedent.  
The application of the FLSA standards to the threshold-
remuneration test is particularly apt. A central purpose of the 
FLSA is to enforce a minimum wage.250 In effect, the FLSA en-
forces the very concept that the threshold-remuneration test 
requires plaintiffs to show: compensation.251 This link between 
the FLSA and remuneration makes the FLSA’s standards for 
when benefits establish an employment relationship persua-
sive. Moreover, the applicability and enforcement of the FLSA 
dictates to some degree the outcome of the first step in the 
threshold-remuneration test.252 For example, if a student intern 
meets the six criteria of the trainee test, that intern is not enti-
tled to compensation and therefore does not receive sufficient 
remuneration to be a protected employee under anti-
discrimination statutes. On the other hand, if an intern’s activ-
 
 247. Mitchell Rubinstein, The Use of Predischarge Misconduct Discovered 
After an Employees’ Termination As a Defense in Employment Litigation, 24 
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1, 12 (1990). 
 248. Mitchell Rubinstein, Advisory Labor Arbitration Under New York 
Law: Does It Have a Place in Employment Law?, 79 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 419, 
437 (2005); see, e.g., Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 419 (1975) 
(interpreting Title VII’s back pay provision based on the NLRA’s similar provi-
sion); Mitchell Rubinstein, The Affirmative Action Controversy, 3 HOFSTRA 
LAB. L.J. 111, 114 & n. 26 (1985) (noting that the term “affirmative action” as 
used in Title VII cases originated in the Wagner Act). 
 249. WBAI Pacifica Found., 328 N.L.R.B. 179, 1273 & n.3 (1999). 
 250. Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206 (2012). 
 251. See Graves v. Women’s Prof’l Rodeo Ass’n, 907 F.2d 71, 73 (8th Cir. 
1990) (“Compensation . . . is an essential condition to the existence of an em-
ployer-employee relationship.”).  
 252. See Yamada, supra note 21, at 244 (“[I]f more student interns were 
paid in compliance with the FLSA, the issue of whether the lack of compensa-
tion precludes the plaintiff from claiming employee status in a discrimination 
claim would become moot in many instances.”).  
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ities deliver an “immediate advantage” to the employer, that 
intern is entitled to a minimum wage253 and will be able to 
demonstrate significant compensation under the threshold-
remuneration test.254 This fundamental connection between the 
FLSA and the concept of remuneration makes the application 
of FLSA standards to the threshold-remuneration test func-
tional and logical. 
An additional benefit of the proposed solution is that it 
does not require enhanced enforcement of the FLSA itself. 
Stronger enforcement of the FLSA likely would increase the 
number of volunteers and interns receiving a minimum wage 
and thereby broaden the range of volunteers able to establish 
significant remuneration.255 The Department of Labor, however, 
has only sparingly enforced the FLSA against illegal unpaid in-
ternships, effectively forcing volunteers to sue under the FLSA 
as a preliminary to a successful Title VII suit.256 But under the 
proposed solution, volunteers need not sue under the FLSA and 
procure a minimum wage before bringing a Title VII or other 
anti-discrimination suit. Instead, volunteers can show employ-
ee status under the modified threshold-remuneration test by 
showing that they are employees entitled to a minimum wage 
under the FLSA. Thus, the proposed solution bypasses the need 
for stronger FLSA enforcement to give those legally entitled to 
compensation the protections of anti-discrimination employ-
ment statutes. 
Using the FLSA standards will substantially improve the 
threshold-remuneration test’s ability to clarify the employment 
relationship. By adopting the FLSA’s explicit definitions of 
what entitles a worker to compensation and what constitutes 
significant compensation, the threshold-remuneration test can 
escape the fate of indeterminate, confusing multi-factor tests.257 
A modified threshold-remuneration test with more rigorous def-
initions of remuneration will relieve some of the existing test’s 
uncertainty.258 Moreover, using the FLSA standards will pre-
 
 253. See Ortner, supra note 60, at 2620. 
 254. See Yamada, supra note 21, at 244. 
 255. See id. 
 256. See Andrew Mark Bennett, Unpaid Internships and the Department of 
Labor: The Impact of Underenforcement of the Fair Labor Standards Act on 
Equal Opportunity, 11 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 292, 
307–08 (2011).  
 257. See Carlson, supra note 9, at 298–99. 
 258. See Rubinstein, supra note 25, at 157 (noting that it “is not an easy 
task” to draw the line between employees and volunteers because “each case is 
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vent absurd situations where an individual is an employee un-
der Title VII but not under the FLSA.259 Applying the thresh-
old-remuneration test with reference to the FLSA’s definitions 
and triggers for compensation will clarify employee status and 
simplify an increasingly muddled area of law.  
C. COUNTER-ARGUMENTS TO A THRESHOLD-REMUNERATION 
TEST MODIFIED BY FLSA STANDARDS 
This section acknowledges four expected counter-
arguments. First, the underlying FLSA rules contain their own 
interpretative challenges and deficiencies. Second, bright-line 
rules like the threshold-remuneration test allow employers to 
manipulate the employment relationship. Third, courts should 
recognize job experience and future job opportunities as sub-
stantial compensation. Fourth, the differing goals of the FLSA 
and anti-discrimination statutes support two different stand-
ards of coverage. This section addresses each of these argu-
ments in turn and explains why they do not extinguish the pro-
posed solution’s benefits of clarity, consistency, and 
predictability. 
1. The Underlying FLSA Framework Contains Its Own 
Problems 
One expected objection to the proposed solution is that the 
FLSA’s standards for distinguishing between employees and 
volunteers pose their own interpretive problems. Some scholars 
argue that the Department of Labor’s six-prong test for deter-
mining the legality of unpaid internships contains significant 
flaws, including differing applications by federal courts,260 an 
unrealistic line between training and work,261 uncertainty as to 
how the test should apply to internships sponsored by colleg-
es,262 and a failure to acknowledge the long-term benefits em-
ployers derive from unpaid interns.263 Others argue that the six-
prong test places a chilling effect on beneficial unpaid intern-
ships that help students develop job skills.264 Some scholars 
 
fact specific”); supra Part II.C.1. 
 259. See DUNLOP COMMISSION, supra note 20; supra Part II.B.2. 
 260. Yamada, supra note 99. 
 261. Yamada, supra note 21, at 233. 
 262. Durrant, supra 145, at 177–78; Yamada, supra note 21, at 233–34. 
 263. Durrant, supra note 145, at 178–79. 
 264. Sarah Braun, Comment, The Obama Crackdown: Another Failed At-
tempt To Regulate the Exploitation of Unpaid Internships, 41 SW. L. REV. 281, 
BODTKE_4fmt 1/6/2015 3:00 PM 
1152 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [99:1113 
 
contend the FLSA harms nonprofit enterprises that rely on 
volunteer work not necessarily within courts’ conceptions of 
“ordinary volunteerism.”265 In contrast, other scholars question 
whether the FLSA framework provides sufficient protection to 
unpaid volunteers in the government and nonprofit sectors.266 
No legal framework is perfect, and the FLSA framework 
for determining when a volunteer becomes an employee is no 
exception. The FLSA standards, however, provide a more de-
fined and workable structure than the present unsettled con-
cept of “threshold-remuneration” applied to Title VII, the 
ADEA, and other statutory anti-discrimination claims. Where-
as courts’ current conceptions of compensation under the 
threshold-remuneration test range from substantial monetary 
payment to more amorphous benefits like job opportunities,267 
the FLSA framework delineates specific categories of remuner-
ation that give rise to an employment relationship268 and crite-
ria an internship must meet not to create employment.269 These 
guidelines can reduce divergent concepts of remuneration that 
lead to inconsistent results. Moreover, by linking the FLSA 
framework to the threshold-remuneration test, legislators can 
address any detriments in the distinction between volunteers 
and employees simultaneously across the FLSA and anti-
discrimination statutes like Title VII. In other words, reforms 
to the FLSA standards will concurrently improve the test to de-
termine employee status under anti-discrimination statutes. 
2. Bright-Line Rules Allow Employers to Manipulate the 
Employment Relationship 
Another concern with a more defined threshold-
remuneration test is that it gives employers the power to decide 
unilaterally whether a volunteer becomes an employee.270 An 
employer may avoid liability under the FLSA and anti-
 
294–300 (2012); Lauren Frederickson, Comment, Falling Through the Cracks 
of Title VII: The Plight of the Unpaid Intern, 21 GEO. MASON L. REV. 245, 269 
(2013). 
 265. Dunn, supra note 64, at 464. 
 266. See Anthony J. Tucci, Worthy Exemption? Examining How the DOL 
Should Apply the FLSA to Unpaid Interns at Non-Profits and Public Agencies, 
97 IOWA L. REV. 1363, 1385 (2012). 
 267. See supra Part II.C.1. 
 268. See 29 C.F.R. § 553.106 (2012). 
 269. FACT SHEET #71, supra note 95. 
 270. I thank Professor Stephen Befort for pointing out this counter-
argument. 
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discrimination statutes by simply not providing its volunteers 
with any benefits (or with only certain nominal benefits).271 
Meanwhile volunteers lack the bargaining power to negotiate 
for greater benefits that might give rise to an employment rela-
tionship and its attendant statutory protections.  
This criticism overestimates employers’ ability to manipu-
late the employment relationship under the proposed frame-
work. If courts tie the threshold-remuneration test to the FLSA 
standards, for-profit employers cannot evade liability under ei-
ther the FLSA or anti-discrimination statutes simply by with-
holding significant benefits from their interns. Because the De-
partment of Labor requires interns be paid whenever their 
work provides an “immediate advantage” to the employer, 
merely not paying the intern will not avoid employment sta-
tus.272 Moreover, the requirement that employers receive no 
immediate advantage from the internship is difficult to fulfill—
especially if the employer’s ulterior motive for the internship is 
free labor.273  
Manipulation of the employment relationship against vol-
unteers in government agencies and nonprofit enterprises is al-
so less likely than it may appear under a FLSA-informed 
threshold-remuneration test. Although the FLSA regulations 
identify specific types of compensation that will not transform 
public agency volunteers into employees, the regulations also 
provide an important caveat: “whether the furnishing of ex-
penses, benefits, or fees would result in individuals’ losing their 
status as volunteers . . . can only be determined by examining 
the total amount of payments made . . . in the context of the 
economic realities of the particular situation.”274 Thus, the pro-
posed solution still retains some flexibility in determining the 
employment relationship that cuts against employer manipula-
tion. Similarly, the FLSA standards for determining when non-
profit volunteers become employees contain the concept of eco-
nomic dependence.275 This standard, while more definite than 
present understanding of “remuneration,” is not a bright-line 
rule. Although my solution recommends that courts apply the 
 
 271. See Flanagan, supra note 158 (“The key[] for employers to avoid turn-
ing interns into employees . . . [is] . . . no or insignificant remuneration . . . .”).  
 272. See FACT SHEET #71, supra note 95. 
 273. See Tuschman, supra note 97. 
 274. 29 C.F.R. § 553.106(f) (2012). 
 275. See Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec’y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 301 
(finding that the volunteers were actually employees because the amount of 
benefits they received made them “entirely dependent upon the Foundation”).  
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public agency standards for stipends and nominal fees to non-
profit enterprises, the case law’s overall economic dependence 
standard still applies.276 As a result, employer manipulation 
under a FLSA-informed threshold-remuneration may be less 
likely than critics suppose.  
That being said, ultimately the employer decides how to 
structure an internship and what benefits to provide volunteers 
in the course of their service. Accordingly, employers can dras-
tically reduce the likelihood of creating an employment rela-
tionship by adhering to the legal requirements. This scenario, 
however, is not necessarily detrimental. For one, it reflects a 
legal system with discernable standards and predictable re-
sults, rather than unclear rules and arbitrary decisions. This 
clarity allows both employers and employees to predict the le-
gal consequences of their actions or situations, and also avoids 
divergent treatment of similarly situated individuals.277 Moreo-
ver, the very fact that volunteers do not receive monetary com-
pensation gives them greater bargaining power than the typical 
employee because they can deprive the institution of their 
freely volunteered labor.278 Nonprofit and government agencies 
depend on volunteers and do not have the luxury of creating an 
environment where people do not want to volunteer.279 Thus, 
although agencies can prevent their volunteers from becoming 
employees, they cannot consequently abuse those volunteers 
with impunity; volunteers can check an agency’s actions by 
threatening to leave. This check on the institution benefiting 
from volunteer labor, although it does not eliminate the institu-
tion’s ability to structure the volunteer relationship, makes 
that ability less worrisome.  
3. Job Experience and Employment Opportunities Should Be 
Included in the Remunerative Concept 
As several scholars point out, however, student interns do 
not have the same freedom as traditional volunteers to exit a 
hostile work environment because they need the job experience 
 
 276. Supra Part III.A.  
 277. See generally Earl Maltz, The Nature of Precedent, 66 N.C. L. REV. 
367, 368–69 (1988) (explaining the need for certainty and equality in the law).  
 278. See Eide, supra note 154. 
 279. Cf. Linda S. Hartenian, Nonprofit Agency Dependence on Direct Ser-
vice and Indirect Support Volunteers: An Empirical Investigation, 17 NON-
PROFIT MGMT. & LEADERSHIP 319, 332 (2007) (noting that agencies do not have 
the luxury of turning away volunteers, even when their performance is sub-
par).  
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and employment opportunities an internship affords to advance 
economically.280 But in this Note’s proposed solution, job experi-
ence and the potential for employment do not constitute signifi-
cant remuneration.281 Arguably this failure to recognize job ex-
perience and opportunities as sufficient compensation to create 
an employment relationship ignores the student intern’s eco-
nomic compulsion to endure a discriminatory workplace.  
This criticism misconstrues the meaning of employment. 
The argument rests on the premise that economic reliance 
alone gives rise to an employment relationship. Employment, 
however, dictates more than economic reliance; it requires an 
economic exchange.282 If an intern is not providing anything of 
value to the company or agency in return for job experience, 
any benefits the intern receives are gratuitous rather than 
compensatory. The FLSA six-part test recognizes this key dis-
tinction by protecting interns whose economic reliance arises 
from a true economic exchange of labor for benefits.283 The point 
is not that unpaid interns who do not provide the company a fi-
nancial advantage deserve discrimination and harassment; the 
point is that unpaid interns who do not provide the company an 
advantage are not employees. Since the protections of the 
FLSA, Title VII, and other statutes rely upon a finding of em-
ployment, those interns do not fall within the Acts’ coverage. 
Therefore, the appropriate remedy to afford interns and volun-
teers protection under Title VII is a legislative amendment ra-
ther than illogical judicial maneuvering that reaches the de-
sired result.  
4. The Goals of the FLSA and Title VII Support Different and 
Separate Standards of Coverage  
The most substantive objection to providing a single stand-
ard for determining volunteers’ employment status under the 
FLSA and anti-discrimination statutes like Title VII is the dif-
fering consequences to volunteers from exclusion from FLSA’s 
protections versus exclusion from anti-discrimination statutes’ 
protections. Most people accept that volunteers do not deserve 
a right to minimum wage because the essence of volunteering is 
 
 280. Kpere-Daibo, supra note 21, at 148–50.  
 281. See supra Part III.A. 
 282. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 138, at 322. 
 283. FACT SHEET #71, supra note 95 (finding employment where the in-
tern’s activities provide an “immediate advantage” to the employer). 
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to work willingly without pay.284 On the other hand, it seems 
unjust for those same volunteers to suffer discrimination and 
harassment without a legal remedy simply because they are 
not paid.285 As a result, two separate standards, one to deter-
mine employment status under the FLSA, and one to deter-
mine employment status under anti-discrimination statutes, 
might better fulfill the statutes’ goals and promote volunteer-
ism,286 even though it would deprive employment law of a uni-
form definition of “employee.” 
While this argument expresses a reasonable policy and 
moral judgment, what it does not express is Congress’s judg-
ment. Congress explicitly made the FLSA’s, Title VII’s, the 
ADEA’s, and other statutes’ coverage contingent on employee 
status. As long as Congress continues to use employee status as 
the “clearly stated basis” for statutory protections, courts are 
constrained by that measure of coverage.287 The O’Connor court 
made this point blatantly, concluding that “it is for Con-
gress . . . and not this court, to provide a remedy . . . for plain-
tiffs in O’Connor’s position.”288 The Juino court too reiterated its 
constrained role, shifting the responsibility to Congress to es-
tablish a basis for coverage other than employment.289 But 
while employment remains the legislatively dictated basis for 
coverage, courts should interpret that basis consistently across 
all statutes that invoke it. Only such consistency can create a 
 
 284. See Dunn, supra note 64, at 469 (arguing that whether a volunteer 
worker is seeking compensation should play a role in whether the FLSA is 
triggered); supra notes 56 and 57 and accompanying text. 
 285. See Dunn, supra note 64, at 471 (arguing that volunteers should be 
exempted from the FLSA but should be included under Title VII and the 
ADEA).  
 286. Id. at 472. I also thank Professor Stephen Befort for pointing out this 
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coherent body of law that fosters predictability and fairness. 
Unless Congress provides clearer direction to define employ-
ment differently under different statutes, courts should pursue 
a consistent definition or else face accountability for an increas-
ingly confused regulatory system.  
One way courts can take a step in the right direction is to 
incorporate FLSA definitions of “significant compensation” and 
triggers for compensation into the threshold-remuneration test. 
This approach would capitalize on the threshold-remuneration 
test’s logic and efficiency while improving its consistency across 
courts and its continuity with the federal statute that regulates 
remuneration. While this approach will clarify the employment 
question only in volunteer contexts, it provides much-needed 
refinement to the “employee” concept. 
  CONCLUSION   
Courts increasingly confront situations where volunteers 
and unpaid interns claim employment status under Title VII 
and other anti-discrimination employment statutes. Faced with 
this novel situation, courts have adopted two different ap-
proaches: (1) the common law agency test that analyzes com-
pensation as one of several non-dispositive factors, or, alterna-
tively, (2) the threshold-remuneration test that requires a 
preliminary showing of sufficient compensation before engaging 
in a common law analysis. This circuit split represents just part 
of a growing non-uniformity in the definition of “employee” 
across statutes, legal tests, and jurisdictions, and demonstrates 
an increasing unpredictability in determining whether an indi-
vidual is an employee. The threshold-remuneration test offers a 
potential solution to this muddled legal landscape in volunteer 
contexts by refocusing on the fundamental definition of em-
ployment and reducing indeterminate multi-factor analyses. 
With all its benefits, however, the threshold-remuneration test 
fails to define remuneration clearly and to correspond to the 
employment statute that actually enforces remuneration: the 
FLSA. These weaknesses threaten to dilute the test’s potential 
clarity and efficiency.  
Courts applying the threshold-remuneration should incor-
porate the FLSA standards for when compensation is required 
and when compensation creates an employment relationship 
into the concept of “significant remuneration.” This approach 
will preserve the threshold-remuneration test’s ability to clarify 
the employment relationship in volunteer contexts and will 
BODTKE_4fmt 1/6/2015 3:00 PM 
1158 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [99:1113 
 
avoid creating situations where an individual is an employee 
under one statute but not another. A modified threshold-
remuneration test can represent a small step towards much-
needed clarity and consistency in employment law’s definition 
of “employee.” 
 
 
